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THE UNUSUAL SUSPECTS: JOURNALISTS AS THIEVES
William E. Lee*
The publication of confidential information by the press stands in stark contrast
to the press' dedication to protecting the confidentiality of sources. While the
Supreme Court has taken the position that the press may publish confidential
information acquired through "routine" newsgathering methods, the contours of
the phrase "routine " newsgathering methods are poorly defined In this Article,
Professor Lee describes the link between the manner in which information is
obtained and the First Amendment's protection of the publication of the
information. He concludes that the proper analysis would separate the interests
affected by publication from the interests affected by illegal newsgathering.
INTRODUCTION
The discovery process in Jones v. Clinton' elicited an extraordinarily detailed
account of President Clinton's sex life.2 To protect potential jurors from "salacious"
publicity,3 Judge Susan Wright imposed a pretrial confidentiality order on the
participants.4 Nonetheless, Peter Baker of the Washington Post wrote a news story
* Professor, Henry W. Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication,
University of Georgia.
990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
2 See id at 664.
Peter Baker, Judge Lifts Gag Order in Paula Jones Case: Sealed Material May
Embarrass Clinton, WASH. POST, July 1, 1998, at A 12.
4 Judge Wright imposed the order on October 30, 1997. See James Bennet, Seal is
Placed on Documents in Clinton Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1997, at A22. Nonetheless, the
order in large part was widely violated. See Paul M. Barrett, Leaks Continue in Paula Jones
Case Despite Gag Order, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1998, at B 1; Gregory C. Baumann, Judge's
Gag Order in Jones Case Falls By Wayside, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 26, 1998, at 24; David E.
Rovella, Jones Suit Shows Gag Weakness, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 23, 1998, at Al. Despite the
detailed media accounts of President Clinton's deposition, Judge Wright refused to lift the
confidentiality order. See Jones v. Clinton, 993 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ordered Judge Wright to reconsider
unsealing the discovery materials after she granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. See Jones v. Clinton, 138 F.3d 758, 758 (8th Cir. 1998). On June 30, 1998,
Judge Wright concluded that the order was no longer necessary because so much detailed
information had been made public through court filings or by leaks published by the media.
See Jones v. Clinton, 12 F. Supp. 2d 931 (E.D. Ark. 1998). President Clinton's attorneys
asked her to reconsider this decision, but Paula Jones' attorneys supported the unsealing.
See Linda Friedlieb, Jones Rethinks, Asks Judge to Lift Gag Order, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
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about Clinton's deposition that drew extensively from the sealed transcript and
provided readers with an eyewitness view.' Baker wrote:
For Clinton, the deposition was an excruciatingly long and intimate look
into his past, as lawyers questioned him not just about Jones and
Lewinsky but also about five other women who were named by the Jones
team. The President's mood seemed generally sober, but as the hours
wore on there were moments of pique as well. His voice was so low at
times that he was asked repeatedly to speak up. At a couple of points,
Clinton seemed agitated, once complaining about conservative attacks on
him and later seeming to dare the Jones lawyers to throw any question at
him that they could come up with.6
Although Baker did not disclose the identity of his source, these details could
come only from someone who was subject to the confidentiality order. In response
to readers' criticism for Baker's refusal to identify his source, the Post's managing
editor, Robert Kaiser, explained that granting anonymity to a source who would face
sanctions if identified was a necessary journalistic practice.7 Furthermore, the Post
believed its role was to seek out and publish sealed information; Kaiser explained,
"We expend much of our energy on finding information of public interest that others
don't want published in a newspaper: That's what the Pentagon Papers case was
GAZETTE, July 23, 1998, at Al. On October 8, 1998, Judge Wright announced that she
would begin releasing the Jones and Clinton depositions on October 19. See Jones v.
Clinton, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (E.D. Ark. 1998). Judge Wright later indicated that she would
hold in contempt anyone who violated her gag order. See Paul Kuntz & David S. Cloud,
Judge Considers Holding Clinton In Contempt, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1999, at A4.
President Clinton was found to be in contempt for willful violation of the court's discovery
orders. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
' See Peter Baker, Clinton Deposition Focused on Lewinsky, WASH. POST, Mar. 5,
1998, at Al.
6 Id. After the story was printed, both sides in the case disclaimed any responsibility
for the leak. See White House Scandal: Who Leaked Clinton Depo? THE HOTLINE, Mar.
6, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws file. See generally Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
'Illegal' Leaks That Aren't, N.Y. L.J., May 26, 1998, at 2 (discussing leaks in Jones v.
Clinton and the Monica Lewinsky investigation). A federal judge has ordered Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr to show that his office was not the source of "serious and repetitive"
leaks of grand jury information to the news media. David S. Cloud, Starr Ordered to Show
He Wasn't Source of Leaks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1998, at A16 (quoting U.S. District
Judge Norma Holloway Johnson); see also Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Rule 6(e) and the
Public's Right to Know, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1998, at A 15.
' See Robert G. Kaiser, A Word to Post Readers: More About Our Sources and
Methods, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1998, at C1.
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about. And there are countless more mundane examples..... When we succeed, we
publish it."'
The Post's defense of its action presents a strange canon of contemporary
American journalism-journalists regard a promise of confidentiality to a source as
sacred, but see nothing wrong with asking a source to break an obligation of
confidentiality. 9 This canon rests upon the premise that it is not illegal for the press
SId at C5.
9 In regards to the acquisition of confidential information, Stephen Shepard, as
Business Week's editor, stated, "We're free to ask for things, and they're free to say no."
Keith Hammonds & Catherine Yang, Business Week vs. the Judge, BUS. WK., Oct. 16,
1995, at 114.
Throughout this Article, the term obligation of confidentiality will refer to legally
enforceable restrictions on disclosure of information. These restrictions include the
following: (1) government employment agreements, see, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (finding that a former CIA agent breached an agreement not
to publish information about the CIA without prepublication clearance); (2) statutes aimed
at anyone with access to a particular type of information, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1996)
(prohibiting the disclosure of "Restricted -Data"); (3) restrictions aimed at certain
individuals who participate in government proceedings, see, e.g., Butterworth v. Smith, 494
U.S. 624 (1990) (finding that a grand jury witness may not be prohibited from disclosing
his or her testimony, but may be prohibited from disclosing the testimony of another
witness); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841 n.12 (1978)
(citing state rules governing members of judicial review commissions or witnesses); (4)
judicially imposed restrictions on attorneys and litigants, see, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (considering the validity of a protective order prohibiting
disclosure of information obtained during discovery); (5) relationships covered under torts
such as breach of confidentiality, see, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1977) (issuing .permanent injunction preventing publication of book based upon
psychiatrist's notes concerning an identifiable patient); and (6) contracts between private
parties, such as those governing trade secrets, see, e.g., Garth v. Staktek Corp., 876 S.W.2d
545 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that an injunction protecting trade secrets did not violate
the Texas Constitution which protects free speech more extensively than the First
Amendment).
Although journalists have been found liable under the tort of promissory estoppel for
breaking promises of anonymity to sources, see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663
(1991), that topic has been extensively examined elsewhere and is only briefly discussed in
this Article. See generally Jeffrey Richards, Confidentially Speaking: Protecting the Press
from Liability for Broken Confidentiality Promises, 67 WASH. L. REv. 501 (1992); Michael
Dicke, Note, Promises and the Press: First Amendment Limitations on News Source
Recovery for Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1553 (1989). For
a discussion of Cohen and its impact on newsgathering, see Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs
Mock a Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta That Bar First Amendment Protection for
News- gathering, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135 (1997).
Apart from the discussion of Doe, see infra notes 153-203 and accompanying text, this
Article is not concerned with the First Amendment rights of a party to a nondisclosure
agreement, such as an employment contract, who wishes to disclose confidential
1999]
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to ask for confidential information, nor is the press liable for publishing that
information." At first blush, there are several Supreme Court decisions supporting
the position that the press is free to publish information it acquires through "routine"
newsgathering methods." However, a closer reading of these cases, reveals that the
contours of the phrase "routine" newsgathering methods are poorly defined. The
Court's cases only tell us that the following are legal newsgathering methods:
1) Monitoring police radio transmissions and "simply" asking for
information from witnesses to a crime12
2) Acquiring information from court proceedings or court documents open
to public inspection' 3
3) Acquiring information from police reports made available to the public,
even when the police err and include information that should not be a
matter of public record.'4
The only instance in which the Court has pronounced the newsgathering methods
of the press possibly illegal was when a newspaper acquired information by
promising anonymity to the source and then published the source's identity. 5 The
information. See generally Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and
Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1998) (discussing the enforcement of
nondisclosure contracts). For a discussion of non-disclosure agreements in the context of
government employment, see Barnard v. Jackson County, 43 F.3d 1218 (8th Cir. 1995)
(finding a government employee's First Amendment right to leak information to be
dubious). See also Alan M. Katz, Comment, Government Information Leaks and the First
Amendment, 64 CAL. L. REV. 108 (1976) (suggesting tests courts can use to determine the
extent of First Amendment protection for employees who leak information); Note, Plugging
the Leak: The Case for a Legislative Resolution of the Conflict Between the Demands of
Secrecy and the Need for An Open Government, 71 VA. L. REV. 801 (1985) (suggesting
that criminalizing leaking and publishing of classified information is necessary to protect
national security).
0 See, e.g., Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 829 (holding that Virginia statute
making it a crime to divulge information regarding judicial review commission proceedings
cannot be applied to nonparticipants).
" See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443
U.S. 97 (1979); Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broad.
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). Although the record was silent on the manner in
which the newspaper acquired the information in Landmark Communications, see 233 S.E.
2d 120, 123 n.4 (1977) rev'd 435 U.S. 829 (1978), the Court regarded that case as one in
which the information was lawfully obtained. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669 (discussing cases
involving "publication of truthful, lawfully obtained information").
12 See Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103.
'3 See Oklahoma Publishing, 430 U.S. at 311; Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 496.
14 See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536.
" See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 663. The Court stated:
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Court's cases are of little value in answering the questions of whether it is legal for
a reporter to induce a grand juror to violate an oath of secrecy, 6 or for a reporter to
receive information with knowledge that the source stole it'7 or acquired it
tortiously.18 Nor do these cases answer the provocative question of whether the
illegal acquisition of information affects the analysis of prior restraint and post-
publication penalty issues.'9
As illustrated by Food Lion's high profile attack on ABC's information-gathering
techniques, 20 lawsuits challenging the manner by which the press obtains its
[I]t is not at all clear that respondents obtained Cohen's name "lawfully" in this
case, at least for purposes of publishing it. Unlike the situation in Florida Star,
where the rape victim's name was obtained through lawful access to a police
report, respondents obtained Cohen's name only by making a promise that they
did not honor.
Id. at 671.
16 See, e.g., State v. Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d 31 (Ind. 1990) (treating reporters' acts as
unprotected newsgathering activities, but ruling that the acts were not contemptuous
because the grand jury's term had expired).
" See, e.g., People v. Kunkin, 507 P.2d 1392 (Cal. 1973) (reversing conviction against
the press because evidence that the defendants knew the information was stolen was
insufficient); see also infra notes 208-23 and accompanying text.
IS See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (addressing a situation in
which journalists received copies of documents from office of a United States Senator with
knowledge that the Senator did not consent to the copying of the documents); see also infra
notes 224-48 and accompanying text.
"9 The Court in Florida Star indicated that when information has been acquired
illegally, it is an open question as to whether the press may be punished for both acquiring
and publishing the information. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535 n.8. See also Landmark
Communications, 435 U.S. at 837 (noting that the Court was not addressing the
applicability of a state law criminalizing disclosure of judicial misconduct investigations
in circumstances where the information is obtained illegally). Moreover, as the discussion
of New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), reveals, the way in which the
case was presented to the Court precluded a direct consideration of the circumstances under
which information-gathering methods are relevant to prior restraint analysis. See infra
notes 26-106 and accompanying text.
This Article examines the relevance of newsgathering conduct for both prior restraint
and publication damages issues. The latter issue has attracted the most attention by
commentators. See, e.g., John J. Walsh et al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin:
The Constitutionality of Consequential Damages for Publication ofIll-Gotten Information,
4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1111 (1996). Commentators have also addressed the First
Amendment's protection for newsgathering activities, without concern for the impact illegal
newsgathering has had on either prior restraint or publication damages issues. See, e.g.,
Note, And Forgive Them Their Trespasses: Applying the Defense of Necessity to the
Criminal Conduct of the Newsgatherer, 103 HARV. L. REV. 890 (1990).
20 See Food Lion Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923,927 (1997) (finding
that jury's punitive damage award for illegal newsgathering did not violate the First
Amendment but reducing the amount awarded on due process grounds), aff'd in part and
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information have emerged recently as a novel litigation strategy. Ashcraft v.
Conoco2 and Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.22 reveal that judges
increasingly are interested in how the press acquires sealed court documents.23 The
media's heightened sensitivity to newsgathering is further demonstrated by the
Cincinnati Enquirer's stunning payment of $10 million to Chiquita to avoid being
sued.24 The settlement was triggered by the newspaper's admission that a series of
unflattering articles about Chiquita were based on voice mail messages stolen from
Chiquita by a reporter.25
This Article explores the link between the manner in which information is
obtained and the First Amendment's protection of that information's publication.
Prior restraint cases are discussed first. Courts usually regard information-gathering
techniques as irrelevant to prior restraint analysis, a position with which this Article
generally agrees. This Article demonstrates, however, that there are rare
circumstances in which analysis of how the information came into the possession of
the communicator helps to illuminate the consequences of publication. This Article's
analysis of post-publication penalty cases concludes that courts should segregate the
interests affected by publication from the interests affected by illegal information
gathering. Newsgathering affects content-neutral interests, allowing claims for
damages from newsgathering to include damage for the communicative impact of a
subsequent publication distorts those interests.
I. PRIOR RESTRAINTS
A question arises as to whether the manner in which information is obtained is
relevant to whether publication can be enjoined. Recently, a federal judge, guided by
a suggestion made by Justice Stevens acting as circuitjustice,26 ruled that the manner
rev'd in part, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26373 (4th Cir. Oct. 20, 1999) (setting aside
judgment on fraud claim and affirming breach of loyalty and trespass judgment); infra notes
390-470 and accompanying text.
21 Ashcraft v. Conoco, No. 7:95-CV-187-BR(3), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092 at *1
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 1998); see also infra notes 286-323 and accompanying text.
22 900 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Ohio 1995), rev'd78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
23 See Ashcraft 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092 at * 15-23; Procter & Gamble at 189-90.
24 See Alix M. Freedman & Rekha Balu, How Cincinnati Paper Ended Up Backing Off
From Chiquita Series, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1998, at Al.
25 See id.; see also Laurence Zuckerman, Paper Forced to Apologize For Articles About
Chiquita, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at AI0. The reporter subsequently pleaded guilty to
one count of unlawful interception of wire communications and one count of unauthorized
access to computer systems. See Reporter Pleads Guilty in Theft of Voice Mail, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1998, at A16.
26 See McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 515 U.S. 1309, 1311 (Stevens,
Circuit Justice 1995). In this case, the petitioner stated that the documents it obtained were
attached to a motion that bore no notations that it was filed under seal. Justice Stevens
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in which Business Week obtained information filed under a protective order was
highly relevant to whether the publication was permissible." The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit sharply disagreed.28 In addition to the Sixth Circuit, the courts
of appeals for the First and Ninth Circuits have ruled that inappropriate information
gathering is irrelevant to prior restraint analysis.29 These appellate courts cited New
York Times v. United States3° ("Pentagon Papers") as support for this proposition.3
However, the Pentagon Papersper curiam opinion does not directly address the issue
of information-gathering. Among the Justices' separate opinions, only Justice
Harlan's dissent regarded the method of acquisition as a relevant factor.32 A
discussion is necessary to determine whether the Court's decision in Pentagon Papers
is appropriately regarded as dismissing information gathering from prior restraint
analysis. This section of the Article will discuss how the information-gathering issues
were treated by courts throughout the Pentagon Papers litigation.
stated that this "seems to acknowledge that the manner in which petitioner came into
possession of the information it seeks to publish may have a bearing on its right to do so."
Id.
27 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 188 (S.D. Ohio
1995), vacated, 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996). For a detailed description of the legal
proceedings that discovered how Business Week obtained the document, see Keith
Hammonds & Katherine Yang, Business Week vs. the Judge, BUS. WK., Oct. 16, 1995, at
114; John E. Morris, How-CouldAnyone Lose This Case?, AM. LAW., Nov. 1995, at 5.
2 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996)
(asserting that while inquiries into how Business Week obtained the documents "might be
appropriate lines of inquiry for a contempt proceeding or a criminal prosecution, they are
not appropriate bases for issuing a prior restraint"). See also In re King World Prod., Inc.,
898 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that no matter how inappropriate the acquisition
of information, the right to disseminate it is protected). Recently, Ford Motor Company
alleged that Robert Lane, the operator of a Web site, improperly acquired Ford trade secrets
and posted them on his site, blueovalnews.com. Drawing heavily upon Procter & Gamble,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Ford's request
for a preliminary injunction enjoining Lane from publishing Ford's trade secrets. Lane was
enjoined from soliciting Ford employees to provide Ford trade secrets. See Ford Motor Co.
v. Lane, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13736 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 1999).
29 See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 518 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 119 S.Ct. 1706 (1999); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1349
(Ist Cir. 1986).
30 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
3, See Berger, 129 F.3d at 518; Providence Journal, 850 F.2d at 1349.
32 Id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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A. Pentagon Papers
The facts of the Pentagon Papers case are well-known and need only be briefly
recounted here.3 Daniel Ellsberg, who had appropriate security clearances, made
copies of a classified Department of Defense history of American involvement in
Vietnam. 4 Ellsberg leaked this information to the New York Times which began
publishing a lengthy series of articles on June 13, 197 1.3 After the Times refused to
comply with Attorney General Mitchell's June 14 request to cease publication of the
series, the government obtained a temporary restraining order on June 15.36 On June
18, the Washington Post began publishing stories based on copies of the leaked
documents it also had obtained from Ellsberg, and the government obtained a
temporary restraining order against the Post." After separate appellate proceedings,
the two cases were combined for Supreme Court consideration. 3' The Court ruled on
June 30 that the restraints were invalid because the government had failed to meet the
heavy burden of proof.39 Although several justices stated in their separate opinions
that post-publication actions against the newspapers for violation of the espionage
laws would be acceptable,4 ° the government's subsequent criminal action targeted
only Ellsberg and several of his associates.41 This criminal action, the first to apply
espionage statutes to someone who leaked classified information to the press,42 was
33 See generally DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF
THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE (1996); HARRISON E. SALISBURY, WITHOUT FEAR OR
FAVOR: THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ITS TIMES, 57-79 (1980) (describing the series of
events which led Daniel Ellsberg to leak information to the Times); PETER SCHRAG, TEST
OF LOYALTY: DANIEL ELLSBERG AND THE RITUALS OF SECRET GOVERNMENT (1974)
(same); SANFORD J. UNGER, THE PAPERS & THE PAPERS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL BATTLE OVER THE PENTAGON PAPERS (1989). Documents from the case are
compiled in, THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY V. UNITED STA TES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(James C. Goodale, compiler, 1971) [hereinafter cited as PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY].
Subsequent page references will be to this compilation rather than to the pagination of the
original document.
14 See UNGER, supra note 33, at 4.
31 See id. at 11-12.
36 See 1 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 27.
17 See 2 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 651.
38 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
39 See id. at 714.
40 See id, at 737 (White, J., concurring); id. at 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 759
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). In their early analysis of potential legal problems, the Times'
attorneys were concerned with criminal prosecution after publication, not prior restraint.
See SALISBURY, supra note 33, at 242.
41 See UNGER, supra note 33, at 6-7.
42 See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication
of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 937 (1973). One of the most interesting
documents produced in the Pentagon Papers case is the affidavit by Max Frankel, the
[Vol. 8:1
THE UNUSUAL SUSPECTS
compromised by government misconduct, such as the notorious White House
Plumbers' burglary of the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.43
In its case against the Times, the government initially characterized the
documents as "stolen," but as the case progressed, the method of acquisition became
increasingly tangential. By the time the case was presented to the Supreme Court, the
issues had been narrowed to focus on the consequences of publication."
The government's memorandum in support of its motion for a preliminary
injunction against the Times claimed that the classified information would not be
lawfully obtainable through the Freedom of Information Act.46 Thus, the newspaper
could not "contend that it [had] any greater right to possession and dissemination of
those documents because of the illegal manner in which they were purloined and
received."47 This statement was followed by a citation analogizing the case at hand
to Maas v. UnitedStates," a 1966 case in which the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia sustained a preliminary injunction preventing publication of a
manuscript prepared by a federal prisoner. Maas was not an appeal of a final
judgment, so the appellate court did not explore the merits of the appellants' First
Times' Washington bureau chief. Frankel gave extensive examples of how government
officials regularly leak classified information to the press. He concluded that without this
process, "there could be no adequate diplomatic, military and political reporting of the kind
our people take for granted, either abroad or in Washington and there could be no mature
system of communication between the Government and the people." I PENTAGON PAPERS
HISTORY, supra note 33, at 397 (affidavit by Max Frankel).
13 For a discussion on the prosecution of Ellsberg and his associates, see SCHRAG, supra
note 33, at 224-77. For analysis of the legal questions raised by the case, see Melville B.
Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the
Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1974).
44 1 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 264 (transcript of June 17, 1971
hearing before Judge Gurfein); id. at 477 (transcript of June 18, 1971 hearing before Judge
Gurfein); id. at 614 (same). The Times responded by claiming that it had done nothing
illegal. See id. at 284 (transcript of June 17, 1971 hearing before Judge Gurfein); id. at 630
(transcript of June 18, 1971 hearing before Judge Gurfein).
41 See New York Times, 703 U.S. at 714.
46 See 5 USCS § 552 (1974).
47 1 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 317 (plaintiff's memorandum in
support of motion for preliminary injunction).
48 371 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
49 See id. at 352-53. A federal regulation prohibited publidation of manuscripts by
prisoners if criminal activities were discussed. An exception was made for organized crime
figure Joe Valachi, subject to approval of the manuscript by the Department of Justice. After
Valachi's agents sought to send excerpts of the manuscript to prospective publishers
without government approval, the Attorney General decided not to allow publication. The
government obtained a preliminary injunction preventing dissemination of the manuscript
in any form. The court of appeals sustained the preliminary injunction, finding no abuse of
discretion by the trial court. See id. at 351-52.
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Amendment argument other than to conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion.5" Because Maas involved a prisoner, whose right to communicate was
subject to substantial governmental control, the case was a dubious precedent for an
injunction against a newspaper. The citation of Maas reveals the paucity of case law
to support the government's claim that the Times' method of newsgathering was
relevant to prior restraint analysis.
The Times' memorandum in opposition to the issuance of the preliminary
injunction quoted at length from the one case that was directly on point, Liberty
Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson."t In that case, a disenchanted employee of a controversial
political organization gave copies of letters and documents to journalists Jack
Anderson and Drew Pearson.52 Liberty Lobby sought a preliminary injunction
preventing publication of the contents of the documents." Judge Holtzoff of the
District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the request, stating:
[F]reedom of the press is not limited to such information as is personally
obtained by newspapermen by observation or from official statements, or
in any other open way. The mere fact that a newspaper man obtained
information in a clandestine fashion or in a surreptitious manner or
because someone unguardedly and unwittingly reveals confidential
information, or even through a breach of trust on the part of a trusted
employee, does not give rise to an action for an injunction. The courts
may not review the manner in which a newspaper man obtains his
information and may not restrain the publication of news merely because
the person responsible for the publication obtained it in a manner that may
perhaps be illegal or immoral. It would be a far-reaching limitation on the
freedom of the press if courts were endowed with the power to review the
manner in which the press obtains its information and could restrain the
publication of news that is obtained in a way that the Court does not
approve. If such were the law, we would not have a free press; we would
have a controlled press. Such, however, is not the law.54
This intriguing passage treated these issues as though they were long settled, yet
Liberty Lobby was a case of first impression." Also, in LibertyLobby, no complicity
between the journalists and the employee was shown, but Judge Holtzoff's opinion
0 See id. at 352.
s, 261 F. Supp. 726 (D.D.C. 1966), affd, 390 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see also I
PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 335-36.
2 See Liberty Lobby, 261 F. Supp. at 727.
13 See id.
14 Id. at 727.
" See id Judge Holtzoff cited no cases in his opinion, perhaps because it was an oral
ruling from the bench.
[Vol. 8:1
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went far beyond the facts of the case. Instead of dealing with only those instances in
which the press is the passive recipient of information, Judge Holtzoff's sweeping
statement that "courts may not review the manner in which a newspaper man obtains
his information," 6 included cases in which the press plays an active role in the
commission of newsgathering crimes." His antipathy towards prior restraints was
so strong that he completely eliminated all newsgathering techniques as a factor to be
considered in prior restraint cases.
The appellate opinion in Liberty Lobby58 markedly contrasted with the lower
court opinion. Justice Warren Burger, then on the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, noted that the right of publication is not absolute, but, "the
balance is always weighted in favor of free expression."59 He believed the appellants
had failed to show ownership of the papers, unlawful taking, or any involvement of
the journalists other than receiving copies of the documents.6" Significantly, he left
open the possibility that under certain circumstances these factors might be relevant
to a prior restraint case, stating, "Upon a proper showing the wide sweep of the First
Amendment might conceivably yield to an invasion of privacy and deprivation of
rights of property in private manuscripts."'" This passage would prove to be a
56 Id.
" Professor Cox has suggested the following analysis where the press publishes
information obtained from a source who breaches an obligation of confidentiality:
Might not a publisher likewise be charged with participation in the wrong? The
argument would be strongest when the publisher induced the violation; weaker
when the publisher was a passive recipient [but had knowledge of the condition
of confidentiality]; and probably untenable in the unlikely event that the
publisher had no notice of the agreement.
Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the
Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1980). But see infra note 202.
s8 390 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The Times cited the appellate opinion in Liberty
Lobby for the proposition that prior restraints bear a heavy burden. See 1 PENTAGON
PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 335 (defendant's memorandum in opposition to
issuance of preliminary injunction). The government also cited the appellate opinion in
Liberty Lobby, but for the proposition that prior restraints are permissible in certain
circumstances. See id at 316 (plaintiff's memorandum in support of motion for a
preliminary injunction).
'9 See Liberty Lobby, 390 F.2d at 491.
60 See id
61 Id. Judge Skelly Wright, concurring, stated that the idea that the lobbying
organization had property rights in the copies sufficient to justify a prior restraint "leaves
me cold." Id. at 492 (Wright, C.J., concurring). He believed monetary damages would be
sufficient compensation to any harm the organization may have suffered. See id (Wright,
C.J. concurring). Wright would later criticize the Solicitor General for advancing a property
rights argument in the Washington Post portion of the Pentagon Papers case. See infra note
73.
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significant part of the government's argument when the Pentagon Papers case was
heard by the Second Circuit.
Despite the government's persistent claims of stolen documents throughout the
district court proceedings, Judge Gurfein's opinion denying the preliminary injunction
made no mention of any linkage between prior restraints and how information is
obtained. To Gurfein, the validity of a prior restraint turned on the impact the
publication would have on national security.62
In its brief submitted to the Second Circuit, the government again referred
repeatedly to the documents as stolen, and insisted that "courts have the power to
enjoin publication of stolen classified documents."'63 In the oral argument, Whitney
North Seymour, Jr., the United States Attorney, referred to Liberty Lobby stating:
[A] close reading of that opinion indicates that there are a number of
exceptions [to the right to publish], including the exception in the case of
documents which have come into the possession of the person under
circumstances where they had reason to believe that they were not
authorized to have them.'
By analogy, he argued that if ajudge's memoirs were stolen by a law clerk and
given to the Times, "there might at least be a question ... as to whether the New
York Times was free to publish that, knowing that they had been stolen. 65 This
prompted Judge Kaufman to say, "I want to make sure I understand you, Mr.
Seymour. Are you arguing that if the documents are stolen documents from a
government office or agency, the newspaper under no conditions has any right to
publish them?, 66 Seymour admitted that stolen documents were not suppressible in
62 See 2 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 665-66 (June 19, 1971 decision
by Judge Gurfein denying government's motion for a preliminary injunction).
63 Id. at 714 (brief for the United States). Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian,
who participants observed as giving the case its "Kafka-like quality," SALISBURY, supra
note 33, at 287, could not understand how the Times could copyright its stories based on
stolen government property. See id. at 298. President Nixon, who saw the case as a "PR
problem," id. at 322 note *, sought to emphasize that the documents were stolen
government property. John Ehrlichman's notes of a June 19, 1971 conversation with
President Nixon reveal that Nixon proposed the catchlines, "Do you approve of the theft of
government papers? Should a thief be punished?" Id. at 322.
64 2 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 897 (transcript of oral argument
before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit). Although he referred to the opinion of
the district court, Seymour most likely meant to refer to the opinion by the court of appeals.
As noted, the district court opinion did not speak in qualified terms, while the appellate
opinion was more in line with Seymour's argument. See supra notes 51-61 and
accompanying text.




all circumstances, adding that "it is a proper element for the Court to consider the
circumstances under which the documents came into the newspaper's possession, and
that it is a weight in the scales."'" Alexander Bickel, counsel for the Times, began his
argument by noting that there was no evidence that the Times stole the documents or
that anybody stole them.6" Judge Friendly responded, "Nobody says the Times went
into the Department of Defense with a chisel. It is equally clear that someone gave
it to the Times when he had no authority to do so. Why not go on from there?"' 9
Bickel admitted he wanted to get the word "stolen" out of the discourse because it
was a "highly colored word.""0 None ofthejudges followed up on North's suggested
line of analysis and questioned Bickel about how much weight should be given to the
circumstances of acquisition.
Neither the Second Circuit in the Times case nor the District of Columbia Circuit
in the Washington Post case addressed the government's claim that the method of
acquisition affected prior restraint analysis7 ' At the Supreme Court, the
government's brief stated that the case hinged on whether publication of the
documents would pose a grave and immediate danger to the security of the United
States:
The answer to this narrow question does not depend upon the fact that all
of the material ... is classified either 'top secret' or 'secret,' that all of it
was obtained illegally from the government and that both the Times and
the Post hold such material without any authorization from the
government.
67 Id. at 898-99. Solicitor General Griswold made a similar argument before the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the case against the Post. See
RUDENSTINE, supra note 33, at 245.
61 See 2 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 923 (transcript of oral argument
before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
69 Id. at 924.
70 Id.
71 See United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2nd Cir. 1971); United
States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Second Circuit
remanded the Times case to the district court for further in camera proceedings to determine
if publication of certain items specified by the government would pose grave and immediate
danger to the security of the United States. No directions were given to reconsider the
relevance of how the Times acquired the documents. See Pentagon Papers, 444 F.2d at 544.
After the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia directed the district court to hold
a hearing at which the government could prove the harm caused by publication in the
Washington Post, the appellate court agreed with the district court that the government
failed to meet the required burden of proof. See Washington Post, 446 F.2d. at 1327.
72 2 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 1167 (brief for the United States).
Professor Rudenstine has stated that this change in strategy was made by Solicitor General
Griswold. See RUDENSTINE, supra note 33, at 273. In its brief, the Times no longer quoted
the lengthy passage from Liberty Lobby about the irrelevance of information gathering to
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However, at the oral argument, Solicitor General Griswold argued that prior
restraints were permissible in a variety of circumstances and gave as an illustration
a hypothetical situation in which the press acquires an unpublished Hemingway
manuscript through theft, breach of fiduciary responsibility by a secretary, or by
finding it on the sidewalk. "If the New York Times sought to print that, I have no
doubt that Mr. Hemingway or now his heirs, next of kin, could obtain from the courts
an injunction against the press printing it."" Griswold then claimed that the
newspapers were intentionally participating in a breach of trust: "They know that
this material is not theirs. They do not own it. I am not talking about the pieces of
paper which they may have acquired. I am talking about the literary property, the
concatenation of words, which is protected by the law of literary property.""' This
prompted the following bizarre colloquy between Justice Stewart and Solicitor
General Griswold:
Justice Stewart: Secondly, I understand, and tell me if I am wrong again,
that your case really does not depend upon any assertion of property
rights, by analogy to copyright law. Your case would be the same if The
New York Times had acquired this information by sending one of its
employees to steal it, as it would if it had been presented to The New York
Times on a silver platter by an agent of the Government. Am I correct?"
Griswold: Yes, Mr. Justice, but I don't think that literary property is
wholly irrelevant here. But my case does not depend upon it.
Justice Stewart: Your case depends upon the claim, as I understand it,
that the disclosure ofthis information would result in an immediate grave
threat to the security of the United States.
Griswold: Yes, Mr. Justice.
Justice Stewart: However it was acquired, and however it was classified.
prior restraint cases. See 2 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 1166-71 (brief
for the United States).
" 2 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 1218 (transcript of oral argument
before Supreme Court). It is surprising that Solicitor General Griswold would use this
example in arguing before the Supreme Court. As noted, the government's brief admitted
the issue was narrow. See supra text accompanying note 72. In addition, while making a
similar argument to the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Skelly Wright reacted
negatively to claims that this case was like a copyright case. See RUDENSTINE, supra note
33, at 245. For further commentary on how this case did not involve property issues similar
to copyright, see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 731 n. I (White, J., concurring).




Griswold: Yes, Mr. Justice, but I think the fact that it was obviously
acquired improperly is not irrelevant to the consideration of that question.
I repeat, obviously acquired improperly."
Griswold conceded that harm stemming from disclosure was the relevant issue,
regardless of whether the information was acquired by theft or gift, but he waffled by
saying that improper acquisition is not irrelevant to the analysis. In doing so, he failed
to specify how much weight improper acquisition should have or how it should be
factored into the analysis,just as Seymour had done atthe Second Circuit. Given the
government's admission that the consequences of publication were the keystone, the
references to improper acquisition appear as rhetorical hyperbole.
By a six to three vote, the Court ruled the government had not met the heavy
burden necessary to justify the prior restraints. 6 Of the Justices in the majority, only
Justice White mentioned the method of acquisition, and this was merely to note its
irrelevance. White's restatement of the case was as follows:
The Government's position is simply stated: The responsibility of the
Executive for the conduct of the foreign affairs and for the security of the
Nation is so basic that the President is entitled to an injunction against
publication of a newspaper story whenever he can convince a court that
the information to be revealed threatens "grave and irreparable" injury to
the public interest; and the injunction should issue whether or not the
" Id. at 1220. Later in the oral argument Justice Stewart again sought to have Solicitor
General Griswold frame the issue in the case:
Justice Stewart: Mr. Solicitor General ... this brings me back to my original
question of a few minutes ago as to what the real basic issue in this case is. As
I understand it, you are not claiming that you are entitled to an injunction
simply or solely because this is classified material.
Griswold: No.
Justice Stewart: Nor do I understand it that you are claiming that you are
entitled to an injunction because it was stolen from you, that it is your property.
You are claiming rather and basically that whether or not it is classified or
however it is classified, and however it was acquired by these newspapers, the
public disclosure of this material would pose a grave and immediate danger to
the security of the United States of America, period.
Griswold: Yes, Mr. Justice.
Id. at 1222. During his argument on behalf of the Post, William R. Glendon described the
record as replete with examples of instances in which government officials leaked classified
documents to the press. See id. at 1229. In response, Justice White asked about the
consequences of theft of government documents by the. press. Glendon replied, "I don't
think the source'of how we obtained them features in this case." Id. Justice White stated
that if theft was irrelevant, leaking was also irrelevant. See id.; infra text accompanying
note 77.
76 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 725-27.
1999]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
material to be published is classified, whether or not publication would be
lawful under relevant criminal statutes enacted by Congress, and
regardless of the circumstances by which the newspaper came into
possession of the information.7"
To Justice White, and by implication those Justices who focused on the "grave and
irreparable danger" standard,78 the issues were properly framed in the government's
brief. Griswold's references to "improper acquisition" at oral argument 79 were
discounted. The only Justice to regard the acquisition of the documents as a relevant
concern was Justice Harlan, who in dissent criticized the frenzied pace of the
litigation which prevented a proper assessment of a number of questions, including:
"Whetherthe newspapers are entitled to retain and use the documents notwithstanding
the seemingly uncontested facts that the documents ... were purloined from the
Government's possession and that the newspapers received them with knowledge that
they had been feloniously acquired."'8 Justice Harlan's brief reference stands against
the collective weight of the Justices in the majority who indicated that in this type of
case, the technique of information gathering does not illuminate the consequences of
publication.
The way in which Justice Harlan phrased his question misstated the record; there
were no findings by either district court concerning how the information was
acquired, let alone findings that the newspapers knew that the information had been
"feloniously acquired."'" As Chief Justice Burger stated, "We do not know the facts
of the cases. No District Judge knew all the facts. No Court of Appeals judge knew
all the facts."8" This absence of facts shows up in the individual opinions of the
Justices; none were able to comment on the newspapers' methods ofnewsgathering,
apart from the rhetorical pronouncements of the three dissenters concerning
" Id. at 732 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See also id. at 717 (Black, J.,
concurring) (stating that "the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source,
without censorship") (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 732.
71 2 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33 at 1220.
80 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This statement was
followed with a citation analogizing Pentagon Papers to the court of appeals' opinion in
Liberty Lobby. See id. Chief Justice Burger believed the press should have returned the
documents to the government, but did not address any link between the method of
acquisition and prior restraint analysis. See id. at 751 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
", Id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Times successfully resisted the Government's
request that it produce the documents, claiming the copies bore handwritten notations that
would facilitate identification of the Times' source. 1 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra
note 33, at 281 (transcript of June 17, 1971 hearing before Judge Gurfein). The Times did
provide the Government with an inventory of the documents it possessed. See id at 292-94.
82 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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"purloined documents." 3 The absence of facts helps explain why the Pentagon
Papers case should not be regarded as a definitive analysis of when the circumstances
of acquisition are relevant to requests for injunctions. Given the record, it would have
been inappropriate for the Court to address the legal consequences of how the
newspapers came into possession of the documents.
There are additional reasons why the case should not be regarded as definitive.
The case presented complex separation of powers issues. The government argued
that the Executive Branch had inherent power to prevent publication that would harm
national security, even in the absence of a specific legislative declaration. 4 To
Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, and, to a lesser extent, Justice Black, the absence
of a relevant statute was troublesome.8" If a statute dealing with publication by
unauthorized parties had existed," Justices Stewart, White, and Marshall might have
voted differently. Also, the case involved the government seeking to prevent speech
about the government. As Justices Brennan and White acknowledged, prior restraint
issues vary in circumstances involving other categories of speech or where "private
rights," such as copyright, are involved." The Pentagon Papers case surely does not
83 Id. at 749. See also id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (referring to the documents as
"feloniously acquired"); id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to "unauthorized
possession").
84 See 2 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 1172-77 (Brief for the United
States). The absence of statutory authority was one of the grounds upon which the Times
attacked the injunction. See id. at 1172. This prompted Justice Douglas to state during the
oral argument, "That is a very strange argument for The Times to be making. The Congress
can make all of this illegal by passing laws." Id. at 1226 (transcript of oral argument).
5 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that the Court
was asked "neither to construe specific regulations nor to apply specific laws"); id. at 732
(White, J., concurring) (stating that in the absence of legislation, he was unable to find that
the inherent powers of the Executive authorized prior restraints against the press); id. at
742 (Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding that the Constitution does not provide for
"government by injunction in which the courts and the Executive Branch can 'make law'
without regard to the action of Congress"). Despite his absolutist interpretation of the First
Amendment, Justice Black did comment, "The Government does not even attempt to rely
on any act of Congress." Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
One of the grounds upon which the Pentagon Papers case was distinguished from the
restraint of atomic weapon information in the Progressive case was the specific statutory
provision authorizing an injunction against communication of "restricted data". See United
States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
86 In his opinion denying the Government's request for a preliminary injunction, Judge
Gurfein held that 18 U.S.C. § 793(e), a statute governing "communication" of national
defense information by those in unauthorized possession of the information, prohibited
"secret or clandestine communication" and did not apply to newspaper publication. 2
PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 661 (June 19, 1971 order).
87 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) (distinguishing
allegedly obscene materials from those at issue in the Pentagon Papers); id. at 731 n.1
(White, J., concurring) (distinguishing injunctions aimed at coercive labor practices, unfair
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control injunctions involving trade secrets, where the method of acquisition is often
a critical factor.88
In two cases subsequent to the Pentagon Papers case, Justices Brennan and
Blackmun treated the method of information gathering as irrelevant to general prior
restraint analysis. Justice Brennan wrote that prior restraints on publications about
pending judicial proceedings were disfavored "no matter how shabby the means by
which the information is obtained." 9 Justice Blackmun stated in a case in which a
company sought to restrain broadcast of a videotape about a meat-packing plant on
the grounds that the tape was acquired through "calculated misdeeds," that the prior
restraint doctrine was applicable even if misdeeds occurred during newsgathering. 9
In both cases, Justices Brennan and Blackmun stated that subsequent civil or criminal
proceedings, rather than prior restraints, were the appropriate sanction for crimes or
torts committed during newsgathering.91 In contrast, Justice Stevens has twice raised
the possibility that the method of information-gathering affects the right to publish.92
Justices Brennan and Blackmun's preference for post-publication sanctions for
newsgathering crimes reflects the view that prior restraints are the "least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights." 93 However, there are other powerful
reasons, unarticulated by members of the Court, why enjoining speech should
generally not be tied to the method of newsgathering.
methods of competition, and copyright infringements from "an injunction against
publishing information about the affairs of government").
" RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40 (1993); and UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2), 14 ULA 438 (1985)
have common elements in their treatment of trade secrets, including liability based upon
acquisition with notice that the information was a trade secret or that it was improperly
obtained. See Giles T. Cohen, Comment, Protective Orders, Property Interests and Prior
Restraints: Can Courts Prevent Media Nonparties from Publishing Court-Protected
Discovery Materials? 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2463 (1996) (analyzing injunctions to protect
trade secrets that are disclosed during the discovery process and arguing that the scope of
a court's injunctive power depends upon how non-litigants acquire material that is subject
to a protective order). Nonetheless, a federal district court recently found that under the
broad holdings of the Pentagon Papers case and Procter & Gamble, the Michigan Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.901 (law. Co-op. 1999), did not justify enjoining
publication of trade secrets in the absence of a confidentiality agreement or fiduciary duty
between the parties. See Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13736 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 7, 1999). See generally Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trading Secrets in the
Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1151
(analyzing the liability issues raised by use of trade secrets obtained from the Internet).
89 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 588 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
o See CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994).
9 See Davis, 510 U.S. at 1318; Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 588 n.15.
92 See McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 515 U.S. 1309, 1311 (Stevens,
Circuit Justice 1995); Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
93 Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559.
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First, a prior restraint case involving a category of speech that is presumptively
protected by the First Amendment requires a particularized inquiry into the
consequences stemming from publication. 94 The method by which the publisher
acquired the information generally does not illuminate the consequences of its
publication." In an injunction proceeding such as the Pentagon Papers case, words
like "stolen documents" are rhetorical tricks designed to color the analysis. However,
the majority of the Court refused to assign any weight to the fact that the documents
were labeled "classified," and also properly ignored the label "stolen.",
Second, inquiries into the method of gathering information are time consuming
and any temporary injunction in place while a court examines information-gathering
methods extracts an irreparable toll on society's interest in timely information. In the
Pentagon Papers case, inquiries by the trial courts into how the newspapers acquired
the documents would have only lengthened the amount of time the illegitimate
restraints were in effect. While a temporary restraining order was in effect in the
Business Week case, the judge devoted two days of hearings-six days apart-to
ascertain how the magazine acquired a document covered by a protective order, and
took another six days before issuing an opinion.97 The Court has emphasized the
importance of very timely judicial decisions in the context of restraints of allegedly
obscene material,98 and highly protected categories of expression require even shorter
periods.99 If the state claimed that a newsgathering crime had been committed, it
"4 Whether phrased as 1) clear and present danger; 2) direct, immediate, and irreparable
danger; or 3) grave and irreparable danger, the analysis is largely the same-precisely
specifying the harm and determining the likelihood that publication will cause the harm to
occur.
" See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (analyzing
whether a broadcast of attorney-client telephone conversations would jeopardize a criminal
defendant's rights to a fair trial). In this case, CNN came into possession of tape recordings
of General Noriega's telephone conversations with his attorney. The judge conducted the
analysis mandated by Nebraska Press Association and did not even consider how CNN
acquired the tapes. See id
96 See supra text accompanying note 70.
97 As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted:
Weeks passed with the 'gag order' in effect, while the court inquired
painstakingly into how Business Week obtained the documents and whether or
not its personnel had been aware that they were sealed. While these might be
appropriate lines of inquiry for a contempt proceeding or a criminal
prosecution, they are not appropriate bases for issuing a prior restraint.
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996); see also
supra note 27 (citing sources of background material regarding the case).
" See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 737-38 (1961) (contrasting the statute
at issue in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), which required a prompt
trial and judicial determination of obscenity within two days of trial, with a statute which
required a prompt trial but imposed no time limit on judicial determination of obscenity).
9' See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (requiring a prompt judicial
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would be unacceptable to restrain publication during the length of time necessary to
conduct a full investigation and criminal trial. Additionally, if an injunction were
issued against one outlet that was being investigated for criminal activity such as
receipt of stolen property, it is quite possible that other communication outlets would
obtain the information, as happened in the Pentagon Papers and Progressive cases.'°°
Third, exploring information-gathering methods raises complex evidentiary
issues. The Business Weekcase was somewhat simplified by a law firm's admission
that one of its partners provided the sealed document to a reporter.'0 ' Despite this
admission, thejudge wanted to know if Business Week's reporters were aware of the
protective order when they received the document." 2 Many news stories do not
involve a single source-information may come from a variety of sources, and one
can easily imagine the difficulty and time necessary for ajudge to review a news story
line-by-line and to determine the source or method used to obtain different statements.
Such inquiries are especially problematic because they probe into sensitive matters
such as the identity of sources who have been offered promises of confidentiality.
These inquiries place journalists in a highly conflicted position-to get a temporary
decision in the special context of film licensing). The Court in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 n.22 (1968), interpreted a requirement for prompt judicial
determination as being satisfied by a nine-day period between the licensing board's decision
and the trial court's ruling. But see Carroll v. President and Commrs. of Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175, 180-82 (1968) (finding that an order, issued ex parte, restraining a rally for 10-
day period was unconstitutional). Professor Blasi has suggested that the time period
between denial of a permit for a demonstration and a judicial decision should be less than
the Court authorized for film licensing. See Vince Blasi, Prior Restraints on
Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1482, 1548 (1970); see also A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that a "delay of even a
day or two may be of crucial importance in some instances").
00 Daniel Ellsberg made portions of the Pentagon Papers available to nearly twenty other
newspapers and a number of them, such as the Los Angeles Times, Philadelphia Inquirer,
Miami Herald, and Chicago Sun-Times, published excerpts while the Times and Post were
enjoined from publishing. This prompted Judge Roger Robb, of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, to ask Solicitor General Griswold if the Government was
"asking us to ride herd on a swarm of bees?" SALISBURY, supra note 33, at 322. In United
States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), the Government
abandoned its effort to obtain a permanent injunction because similar information was
published by others while The Progressive was enjoined. See GERALD GUNTHER &
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1357 n.3 (13th ed. 1997).
01 See Procter and Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 189 (S.D. Ohio
1995). The magazine's reporter refused to identify her source, but the admission that the
source was located in New York State and that she obtained the sealed document on the
same day as she requested it led Sullivan & Cromwell to discover that one of its partners
was the source of the leak. See Morris, supra note 27 at 6.
"02 See Procter and Gamble, 900 F. Supp at 188. The judge concluded that Business
Week was aware of the protective order before it obtained the document. See id. at 191.
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restraint lifted, or prevent the imposition of a restraint,joumalists must disclose how
information was obtained, including the identity of a source who has been promised
anonymity. Failure to identify the source or to cooperate with these inquiries may
result in a contempt sanction. 0
3
Fourth, there must be a distinction between acts of good fortune, such as finding
confidential materials on the sidewalk, to use Solicitor General Griswold's
hypothetical example, and intentional acts such as burglary. These distinctions are
appropriately established in legislation, rather than on an adhoc basis by courts. If
the legislative branch authorizes an injunction against publication of information
stolen by ajournalist, the issues become clearer. The Government or private litigant
is no longer able to claim, unlike in the Pentagon Papers case, that the method of
acquisition is a weight in the scales, albeit an undefined weight.0 4 Courts are
presented with a clear legislativejudgment that the interest in protecting property, for
example, outweighs the right to publish as opposed to the equity issues presented in
the Pentagon Papers case. A legislative judgment permits a court to focus on core
issues such as whetherthe interest in property or confidentiality outweighs the interest
in free expression, and whether less restrictive measures, such as post-publication
proceedings, are more appropriate.
The necessary compromise between freedom of expression and control of
confidential information has largely been drawn in the following terms: the
publication process is protected in almost all circumstances, but post-publication
sanctions are applicable to sources who violate confidentiality agreements, or to
journalists who act illegally while gathering information.' This resolution reflects
our society's aversion to prior restraints. To add a point of nuance, there are rare
03 As one attorney commented on the Business Week proceedings:
The problem that this underscores is what is wrong with the entire
procedure of a hearing about "How did you get this material?" says one First
Amendment specialist who asked not to be identified. "As soon as you get a
reporter on the stand to talk about newsgathering, your source is at risk. I have
no doubt that in this case the reporter thought that she would be able to protect
her source.
"I am more concerned by the hearings on 'Where did you get this?' than
by the prior-restraint issues. The proceedings are unprecedented and
terrifying," the lawyer says, adding, "If worst comes to worst, you go into
contempt on the grounds that it doesn't matter [where you got the material] and
take your appeal from that."
Claudia MacLachlan, Did Business Week Fold Too Easily?, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at
A l, A21 (alteration in original).
'0 See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
05 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13736 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
7, 1999) (denying request for preliminary injunction but noting that the operator of a Web
site may be subject to criminal prosecution for improperly acquiring information).
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instances in which the method of information gathering illuminates the nature of the
information and the consequence of its publication.'0 6
Two prior restraint cases provide insight into instances when information-
gathering methods should or should not be considered. In the first case, the
information-gathering methods diverted attention from the appropriate issues, and in
the second case, the manner in which the information was acquired was an
appropriate part of the analysis.
B. Titicut Follies
The Bridgewater Correctional Institution, run by the Massachusetts Department
of Corrections, is a unique facility housing civilly committed mentally ill patients with
criminally insane inmates." 7 The "repulsive reality"'0 8 ofBridgewater is captured in
"Titicut Follies," a documentary film produced by Frederick Wiseman. 0 9 The
rawness of "Titicut Follies" is reflected in the following passage from the film journal
Sight & Sound:
In another sequence, an emaciated old man who hasn't eaten in two days
is led naked to a room where the same doctor informs him.that he has a
choice of eating voluntarily or being force-fed. When he doesn't respond,
four guards hold him down by twisting towels round his wrists and ankles
while the doctor inserts a tube into his nose and down his throat. The
doctor then stands on a chair and pours liquid down a funnel connected to
the tube, all the while holding a cigarette in his mouth, the ash getting
precariously longer. In the middle of the sequence, Wiseman cuts to a
shot of the man being shaved meticulously a few days later; it takes a
while for us to realize that we are watching a corpse being prepared for
burial. The body is laid out in a coffin, dressed in an ill-fitting suit; better
cared for, one might think, in death than in life."0
The film received critical acclaim when it was shown in 1967, but state officials
quickly objected to the film's "excessive nudity."''.
106 See infra text accompanying notes 153-203.
'07 See Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Mass. 1969).
1o' Id. at 614 n.5.
'09 See id at 612.
"0 Charles Taylor, Titicut Follies, SIGHT AND SOUND, Spring 1988, at 100, 102.
. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 613. For discussion of the political outcry surrounding
"Titicut Follies," see Taylor, supra note 110, at 100-01; Tempest in a Snakepit, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 4, 1967, at 109.
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Two legal actions seeking to prevent exhibition of the film were brought, each
resulting in distinct outcomes. In the first, Cullen v. Grove Press, Inc., 2 four
correctional officers sought a preliminary injunction on the ground that the film
violated their right of privacy. 13 A federal district court found that the film was not
a false report of the conditions at Bridgewater and thus, its exhibition was protected
by the First Amendment." 4 In the second case, Commonwealth v. Wiseman,' "5 state
officials claimed that the film invaded the inmates' privacy and that Wiseman violated
contract provisions concerning the production and exhibition of the film." 6 A state
superior court prohibited all exhibitions of the film, but the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court modified the decree to allow exhibitions to specialized audiences such
as sociologists, social workers, and psychiatrists."' Both the Cullen and Wiseman
opinions are troubling, albeit for different reasons.
Cullen involved the same New York privacy statute"' that had been at issue in
Time, Inc. v. Hill." 9 Based upon the Supreme Court's Hill opinion, the court in
Cullen believed the appropriate test was whether the subject matter was of public
interest and whether the film gave a recklessly false account of the conditions at
Bridgewater. 2 ' Judge Mansfield regarded the public's need to be informed of the
government's treatment of the mentally ill as "both legitimate and healthy."''
Additionally, he concluded the film was an accurate portrayal of the "gruesome and
depressing" environment at Bridgewater.' The district court's preference for open
112 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
" See id. at 728.
.". See id. at731.
"1 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969).
116 Seeid at 613-14.
17 See id at 618.
11s See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW. § 50 (Consol. 1982).
19 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (ruling that false light invasion of privacy claims concerning
matters of public interest require proof that the defendant acted with knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard of the truth).
12o See Cullen, 276 F. Supp at 729.
.2 Id. Judge Mansfield continued:
Quite aside from the fact that substantial sums of taxpayer's money are spent
annually on such institutions, there is the necessity for keeping the public
informed as a means of developing responsible suggestions for improvement
and of avoiding abuse of inmates who for the most part are unable intelligently
to voice any effective suggestions or protests. Distasteful as the subject matter
may often be, it represents an ever-increasing phenomenon in our society that
cannot be swept under the rug.
Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 398 U.S. 960,962 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting
from denial of cert.) ("It is important that conditions in public institutions should not be
cloaked in secrecy, lest citizens may disclaim responsibility for the treatment that their
representative government affords those in its care.").
122 Cullen, 276 F. Supp. at 730.
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discussion of matters of public interest, like that of the Supreme Court in Hill,
appropriately discounted the guards' privacy claim.'23 However, the Hill test was
designed for post-publication actions and its application to a request for a preliminary
injunction was misplaced because it left open the possibility ofan injunction if falsity
were found. Apart from that flaw, the fundamental conclusion of the opinion was
sound-government officials have limited expectations of privacy concerning their
on-the-job actions and true reports of those actions do not justify prior restraints.' 24
Though it dealt with the issue only briefly, the district court stated that even if
Wiseman violated an understanding with the guards about what would be portrayed
and where the film would be exhibited, a prior restraint would still be
impermissible.
25
In Wiseman, state officials claimed that Wiseman was granted access to
Bridgewater based upon conditions, such as requiring that only legally competent
inmates who signed written releases be portrayed and that the film would not be
released without approval from state officials. 26 These conditions were not written
123 The court stated that inmates could bring privacy suits. See id. at 731; infra note 133
and accompanying text.
124 Commentators and courts have generally disfavored injunctions as remedies for
invasion of privacy cases. See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 420 (1971) (invasion of privacy is not a sufficient basis for an injunction prohibiting
peaceful distribution of literature concerning real estate broker's practices); In re
Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1350 (1st Cir. 1986) (an infringement upon privacy
is an insufficient basis for a prior restraint) modified by 820 F.2d 1354 (1 st Cir 1987) (en
banc); Gilbert v. National Enquirer, Inc., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 91, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(harm to right of privacy and reputation "are not the sort of 'extraordinary circumstances'
required to justify a prior restraint") (quoting Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116 (Cal.
1975)); Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARV.
C.R-C.L. L. REV. 329, 349 (1979) (discussing that prior restraint is inappropriate in a
privacy case); John W. Wade, The Tort Liability of Investigative Reporters, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 301, 340 (1984); cf Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116, 121 (Cal. 1975) (holding
that prior restraint was inappropriate in a defamation case). But see Huskey v. National
Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1294-96 (N.D. I1. 1986) (concluding that injunctive relief
is not improper to prevent a privaie wrong such as invasion of privacy).
In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), Chief Justice Hughes noted that with
certain categories of expression, such as obscenity, prior restraints were permissible. Id. at
716. After noting that these categories were not at issue in Near, Chief Justice Hughes
added, "Nor are we now concerned with questions as to the extent of authority to prevent
publications in order to protect private rights according to the principles governing the
exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of eiuity." Id. This statement was followed with a
citation to Roscoe Pound, Equitable ReliefAgainst Defamation and Injuries to Personality,
29 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916). Justice Harlan later read this passage as rejecting Pound's
argument "that if the material was unprotected the time of suppression was immaterial."
Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967).
23 See Cullen, 276 F. Supp. at 73 1.
126 See Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 612.
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and Wiseman sharply disputed their existence at trial.2'" It is clear that Wiseman was
constantly accompanied by guards during the 29 days he filmed at Bridgewater. 2
Wiseman thought that the guards would prevent him from filming inmates who were
incompetent to consent to the filming. 29 Significantly, no government officials
objected to Wiseman's methods while he was filming. 3 ° Reviews of the film,
praising Wiseman and condemning the conditions at Bridgewater, set in motion a
political firestorm in which politicians condemned Wiseman for exploiting naked
inmates for profit.'
The trial judge regarded Wiseman's motives as crassly commercial and believed
the film trafficked on the "loneliness, on the human misery, degradation and
sordidness in the lives of these unfortunate humans.' 32 Although no inmates or their
relatives testified against the film, the trial judge concluded that any releases obtained
127 See Comment, The "Titicut Follies" Case: Limiting the Public Interest Privilege, 70
COLUM. L. REv. 359, 360 (1970); Judge Lifts Ban on "Titicut Follies" Film, NEWS MEDIA
& LAW, Fall 1991, at 36.
Wiseman initially approached the Superintendent of Bridgewater with the idea of a
film in 1965. The superintendent thought a film would improve conditions at Bridgewater
by helping obtain increased allocations from the legislature. Wiseman outlined the approach
he would take in a letter to the Commissioner of Corrections: "No people would be
photographed who do not have the competency to give a release .... The question of
competency would in all cases be determined by the superintendent and his staff and we
would completely defer to their judgment." Taylor, supra note 110 at 100 (quoting letter
from Frederick Wiseman to John Gavin, Aug. 1965). Permission to film at Bridgewater was
given to Wiseman after the Attorney General wrote an advisory opinion that "consenting"
inmates could be filmed. While filming, Wiseman was accompanied by a guard and he
assumed that the guard, as a representative of the superintendent, was making judgments
as to who was competent to give releases. See Taylor, supra note 110, at 100.
On the issue of whether he agreed not to release the film without approval from state
officials, Wiseman stated that only an "absolute fool" would "contract away" First
Amendment rights. Taylor, supra note 110, at 101. "1 mean particularly to three such
undistinguished 'filmmakers' as the Commissioner of Corrections, the superintendent and
the Attorney General. You'd have to be totally out of your mind to give them, or anybody
else, but particularly them, final cut." Id.
128 See Taylor, supra note 110, at 102.
129 See id. at 100. The trial court concluded that valid releases were obtained from only
a small number of the inmates shown in the film. See Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249
N.E.2d at 613.
130 See Taylor, supra note 110, at 102.
131 See id. at 100-101; You Start Off with a Bromide: Conversation with Film Maker
Frederick Wiseman, CIV. LIBERTIES REV., Winter/Spring 1974, at 52, 65-66 [hereinafter
Conversation with Wiseman].
132 Comment, supra note 127, at 361 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wiseman, No. 875-38
(Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1968) (unpublished superior court opinion)). Wiseman stated that
Judge Harry Kalus "hated me and hated the movie, from the first day. The moment the
thing got started, I knew I was cooked." Taylor, supra note 110, at 101.
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were invalid, that the film would cause humiliation, and that the Commonwealth was
obligated to protect the right of privacy of the inmates against "exploitation."' 33 In
addition to prohibiting exhibition, the superior court ordered Wiseman to surrender
the film and unused footage to the Attorney General so that it could be destroyed.
The Supreme Judicial Court's opinion treated the case as presenting both breach
of contract and invasion of privacy issues, 34 but neither analysis is satisfactory. The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that Wiseman had not obtained written
releases from those who were competent to understand a release.' The court
imposed a virtually impossible standard upon documentary film makers, indicating
it would not regard a release from a competent person as valid until the person
"giving it had seen the film and fully understood how he was to be portrayed."' 36
This standard vastly exceeds anything Wiseman and state officials discussed.
Moreover, this standard allows subjects who have second thoughts about portrayals
that turn out to be unflattering to sharply restrict speech about themselves. As a
consequence, the documentary form would be converted into a public relations tool,
rather than a form of social criticism.
Even more troubling is the appellate court's belief that the contract provision
concerning consent was a condition sufficient to override Wiseman's First
Amendment right to exhibit the film. The appellate court regarded Bridgewater as
a place that was not "open for public inspection and photography,"'137 apparently an
attribute which allowed the state to attach conditions to entry. Yet, this proves too
much. Even the state's power to deny Wiseman access to Bridgewater would not
mean that any condition, no matter how burdensome, could be imposed upon him.
'33 See Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610, 614 (Mass. 1969) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wiseman, No. 875-38 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1968) (unpublished
superior court opinion)). One inmate was listed as a plaintiff through the superintendent
as his guardian. See id. at 613 n.3. The irony of regarding the state as the guardian of an
inmate's privacy, when the state's otherwise callous treatment of inmates is depicted by the
film, escaped Judge Kalus.114 See id. at 616.
... See id. at 614-15.
136 Id. at 617 n.9. Consider, for example, Wiseman's 1974 discussion of his method of
getting consent from his subjects:
Wiseman: I don't get written releases, but I do get consents. Either before the
sequence is shot or just after, I explain to the participants that I'm making a.
film that's going to be shown on television .... I ask whether they object to my
using the sequence in the film. And I tape record the question and the answer.
[Civil Liberties Reviewl: Do they ever object?
Wiseman: Very rarely. And if they do object, I don't use the sequence. But the
objection has to be registered at that time. In other words, I don't go back and
look for people a year after the flm is edited and ask permission then.
Conversation with Wiseman, supra note 131, at 64 (emphasis added).
'37 Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 617.
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Assume for example, that instead of a contract, the state had a statute governing
portrayals of inmates. It is difficult to imagine an appellate court not examining the
constitutionality of the statute. Yet, the Supreme Judicial Court was uninterested in
pursuing any substantive First Amendment analysis ofthe contract issues and quickly
shifted to privacy issues. 3 '
Even assuming "Titicut Follies" portrayed inmates without their consent, the
branch of privacy known as public disclosure acknowledges that nonconsensual
disclosures of embarrassing true facts are protected if newsworthy. The
Massachusetts appellate court did not regard exhibition of "Titicut Follies" with the
same public importance that the Cullen court had.'39 Instead, it concocted the
premise that limited exhibitions of the film to restricted audiences of professionals,
such as sociologists and social workers, would benefit the public interest.'4° To the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, members of the general public would merely
be interested in the film out of curiosity, while exhibition to specialized audiences,
"with potential capacity to be helpful," overrode any humiliation of inmates.' 4 ' Apart
from discounting the benefits from voter pressure on government officials to improve
Bridgewater, 42 it is extraordinary, under the First Amendment, to carve out
"information elites" while distrusting the general public's use of information.
Wiseman marks the first judicial recognition of a right of privacy by
Massachusetts courts. The appellate court viewed privacy as a single concept,
probably because of its unfamiliarity with the development of the distinct branches
of privacy in other states. In the development of the privacy tort, courts have treated
intrusion issues as being distinct from disclosure of private facts.'43 To the extent
that the inmates were made available to Wiseman and his film crew, this raises
' See id at 616 (stating that privacy concerns, combined with Wiseman's failure to
comply with the consent requirement, justify injunctive relief). In dissenting to the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari, Justice Harlan claimed that the injunction was not "a mere
remedy for a breach of contract," but that "invasion of privacy underpins the Massachusetts
court's action and that the failure to obtain releases served only to underscore that
invasion." Wiseman, 398 U.S. at 964 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
"' Compare Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 618, with Cullen v. Grove Press, Inc., 276 F. Supp.
727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
140 See Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 618.
'4' Id.
'42 Curiously, the appellate court rejected the state's request that it impose a constructive
trust on the receipts from previous exhibitions of the film because "the film may indirectly
have been of benefit to some inmates by leading to improvement of Bridgewater." Id. at
619.
43 See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that the
question of whether information is genuinely private or is of public interest should not turn
on the manner in which it is obtained); DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY § 2.4, at
31-32 (1991) (requiring intent to interfere with solitude; disclosure without intent is not
enough).
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intrusion issues such as whether the filming unreasonably exceeded the normal
conditions of confinement.'44 An injunction against exhibition of the film would not
rectify any intrusion that occurred during the filming. However, the primary focus
of the Massachusetts appellate court was the effects of the film's exhibition. The
court's conclusion that exhibitions to specialized audiences were beneficial, while
exhibitions to the general public were harmful, is akin to splitting the baby. If limited
exposure of the shocking conditions at Bridgewater overwhelms the inmates' privacy
because it is likely to result in improvements atthe facility, it is strange to believe that
citizens would not react to the film by holding goyernment officials accountable for
the conditions depicted in "Titicut Follies."
There is a strange dissonance in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion. The court
acknowledged that public officials consented to production of the film because they
thought it "might arouse public interest and lead to improvement" at Bridgewater. 4 '
However, the court did not recognize that the true beneficiaries of the injunction
against general exhibition of the film were government officials. As Wiseman stated,
the concern of government officials about privacy was "high-winded pomposity."' 46
He added that if the "politicians in Massachusetts were genuinely concerned about
the privacy and dignity of the inmates of Bridgewater, they would not have allowed
the conditions that are shown in the film to exist. They were more concerned about
the film and its effect on their reputations than they were about Bridgewater."' 47
Speech about government is widely recognized as being at the core of the First
Amendment's protection, 48 yetthis value is utterly unacknowledged in the Supreme
Judicial Court's opinion. Furthermore, the Massachusetts court referred to no prior
'" Any serious analysis of whether the filmmaking process was intrusive must
acknowledge the fact that Bridgewater was open for tours by visitors. Wiseman claims that
in the year before the "Titicut Follies" litigation, 9000 to 10,000 visitors toured the facility.
See Taylor, supra note 110, at 101. See also Huskey v. National Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp.
1282, 1288-89 (N.D. I11. 1986) (stating that the determination of whether or not a
broadcaster's act of filming a prison inmate is objectionable depends upon the inmate's
degree of seclusion).
In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978), Chief Justice Burger wrote,
"Inmates in jails, prisons, or mental institutions retain certain fundamental rights of
privacy; they are not like animals in a zoo to be filmed and photographed at will by the
public or by media reporters, however 'educational' the process may be for others." For
criticism of this passage, see William E. Lee, Privacy Intrusions while Gathering News: An
Accommodation of Competing Interests, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 1243, 1279 (1979).
141 Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 617.
.46 Conversation with Wiseman, supra note 131, at 66.
1,17 Id.; see also Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("If controversial political writings attack those in power, government officials
may benefit from suppression although society may suffer.").
14' See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("[Sjpeech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression, it is the essence of self-government.").
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restraint precedents, except to briefly cite a case for the proposition that injunctions
must be narrowly tailored. 49 The opinion is out of step with the generally recognized
remedy for public disclosure of private facts-a post-publication suit for damages. 5 '
Interestingly, after the injunction was in place, a group of inmates brought suit for
invasion of privacy and a superior courtjudge ruled that the film had caused no harm
to the plaintiffs and had actually benefitted them. 5' The prohibition on public
exhibitions of the film was lifted in July 1991, when a superior courtjudge concluded,
"As each year passes, the privacy issue of this case is less of a concern to the court
than the prior restraint issue."'
C. In Search of a Response
From 1956 to 1963, Jane Doe, her husband, and their son were patients of Dr.
Roe, a psychiatrist."' In 1973, Roe and her husband, psychologist Peter Poe,
published In Search of a Response, a three-section book focusing solely on the
treatment of the Does.'54 The first section is a monologue by the son, who is labeled
"autistic."' The second section is a 354-page account of Jane Doe's treatment for
schizophrenia.'56 The third section is a 613-page description of the husband's
treatment for schizophrenia. 7 The sections concerning the married couple are nearly
verbatim discourses of the patients' conversations with the doctor.' The patients
disclose exceptionally intimate feelings and emotions, the character of which is
revealed in the following brief passage by Jane Doe:
This is the way I have been achieving orgasms-it is frightening. I have
a sense of loss of immediate contact-it is not happening between me and
Henry, but between me and the fantasy. Will I need the fantasy for the
rest of my life to enjoy sex? Henry's body is not stimulating to me any
more-something is robbing me of becoming excited by him. Ijust want
141 See Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 618 (citing Carroll v. President & Commrs. of Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183-84 (1968)).
"5o See supra notes 91 & 124 and accompanying text.
... See Letter from Blair L. Perry, attorney for Frederick Wiseman, to the author (Feb.
14, 1998) (on file with author).
152 Judge Lifts Ban on "Titicut Follies" Film, NEWS MEDIA & LAW, Fall 1991, at 36,37
(quoting a Suffolk, Massachusetts, Superior Court judge).
's3 See Respondent's Brief at 5, Roe v. Doe, 417 U.S. 907 (1974) (No. 73-1446).
's" See id at 1-2.
... See Amici Curiae Brief for the American Psychiatric Association, the American
Psychoanalytic Association, and the American Orthopsychiatric Association at 6, Roe (No.
73-1446) [hereinafter APA Brief].
156 See id.
11 See id.
"' See id. at 6-7.
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to be more sinful with him-lewd-I like to say things to him, or if I do
say-he should respond-but he doesn't. I would like to have a
homosexual relationship-then I wouldn't have to have a fantasy or be
lewd or sinful."5 9
In addition to the patients' dialogues, there are 1,716 footnotes providing the authors'
explanations and commentary. 6
0
Jane Doe's husband died prior to publication of the book, ' 6' but she brought suit,
claiming she was identified by the book and did not consent to its publication. 62 The
authors argued that they disguised the identity of the patients by changing their names
and the number of their children6 and that Jane Doe orally consented to publication
earlier while she was undergoing therapy.'" A New York supreme court issued a
preliminary injunction limiting circulation of the book to scientific readers. 65 The
court ruled that "[wihen confidential information is learned, in confidence, under a
contract that it shall not be disclosed," the doctrine of prior restraint did not apply.'
66
The appellate division of the supreme court, drawing upon privacy and the
confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship, modified the injunction to
preclude all distribution of the book during the litigation. 67 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, but after hearing oral argument, the Court
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. 6 The New York Supreme Court then
issued a permanent injunction against any distribution of the book and awarded
$20,000 in compensatory damages.69
The manuscript was prepared while the Does were being treated by Roe, and
written consent to a waiver of confidentiality was sought at that time but not
obtained. 70 Roe claimed that oral consent was obtained during the therapy process,
'59 Respondent's Brief at 7-8, Roe (No. 73-1446).
'6 See APA Brief at 6, Roe (No. 73-1446).
161 See id at 5.
162 See id at 5-6.
163 See Petitioner's Brief, at 4 n.2, Roe (No. 73-1446).
'64 See id, at 4.
165 See id. at 5.
"6 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, app. C at 4a, Roe (No. 73-1446) [hereinafter Doe
Petition].
167 See Doe v. Roe, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (per curiam), affdmem.,
307 N.E.2d. 823 (1973), amended by, 34 N.Y.2d 562 (1974) (granting motion to amend
remittitur).
168 See Roe v. Doe, 420 U.S. 307, 307 (1975) (per curiam).
'69 See Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 679 (1977). The court stated that a physician
"impliedly covenants to keep in confidence all disclosures made by the patient concerning
the patient's physical or mental condition as well as all matters discovered by the physician
in the course of examination or treatment." Id. at 674.
'70 See APA Brief at 8-9, Roe (No. 73-1446).
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but the court issuing the preliminary injunction ruled: "A doctor who wishes to
publish confidential material about his patient and relies on the patient's consent
should take care to get that consent in clear, unambiguous written form."'' The
court issuing the permanent injunction found that the authors were "well aware" that
they did not have consent for publication." Due to the extraordinary nature of the
physician-patient relationship that develops during psychotherapy, consent obtained
during therapy has little likelihood of being informed and voluntary; the patient
becomes emotionally dependent upon the therapist and this may make it difficult for
the patient to resist the doctor's request. '73 Given the lengthy period of time between
preparation of the manuscript and its publication, the extraordinary nature of the
revelations, and Jane Doe's protests through her attorney when she learned of the
planned publication,' 74 the requirement of written consent obtained in noncoercive
circumstances seems reasonable.
Lack of consent, of course, is only an issue if Doe is identified. The field of
psychiatry depends upon publication of case studies, but the custom in the field is to
disguise the identity of patients and where disguise is not possible, the obligation of
confidentiality prevails." As Josef Brauer and Sigmund Freud wrote in the
introduction to their pathbreaking Studies on Hysteria,
[T]he subject matter with which we deal often touches upon our patients'
most intimate lives and history. It would be a grave breach of confidence
to publish material of this kind, with the risk of the patients being,
recognized and their acquaintances becoming informed of facts which
were confided only to the physician. It has therefore been impossible for
us to make use of some of the most instructive and convincing of our
observations."76
Doe Petition, app. C at 6a, Roe (No. 73-1446).
2 Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 671. In the portion of the book dealing with the husband's
treatment, he is quoted as saying, "Who do you think you are, writing a book?... My life
has been wrecked by you, you lousy stinking analyst. The treachery of it to make such a
book.... You are a mad scientist." APA Brief at 28 n.26, Roe (No. 73-1446).
'7 See Case note, Roe v. Doe: A Remedy for Disclosure of Psychiatric Confidences, 29
RUTGERS L. REv. 190, 194-95 (1975).
7 Prior to the book's publication, Doe learned through a colleague that Roe was about
to publish a book. When the contents were described, Doe recognized it as the manuscript
that had been prepared while she was in therapy with Roe. Doe's attorney then wrote to
Roe, asking for an opportunity to review the manuscript to determine whether it contained
a violation of the physician-patient confidentiality. See APA Brief at 5-6, Roe (No. 73-
1446).
'7 See Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 677 n.9 (referring to standards of the Group for the
Advancement of Psychiatry).
116 JOSEF BREUER & SIGMUND FREUD, STUDIES ON HYSTERIA at xxix (Hogarth Press
1955).
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The court issuing the preliminary injunction found that the defendants took
reasonable steps to disguise the patients' identities and the book would not "really
identify plaintiff as the patient to someone who did not already know that plaintiff
was the patient."'" There are two problems with this approach. First, the book was
not published under a pseudonym, and because psychotherapists, like Jane Doe, often
reveal their psychiatrists' names to their professional colleagues, many of Doe's
colleagues would readily become aware of Doe's identity.'78 Second, Jane Doe was
unconcerned that the book would identify her to all readers of the book. Rather, her
concern was that her acquaintances, who were familiar with distinguishing
characteristics of her life, would recognize her.'79 In addition to accurately listing
characteristics such as the ages, education, and religious affiliation of the Does, the
book left undisguised the following rather unusual circumstances that would readily
allow identification by those who knew the Does: the son was an autistic child who
had written three operas while young; the husband went to Harvard Law School,
dropped out to become a speech writer, then resumed the study of law at the age of
50 and became an attorney; the wife was a psychotherapist whose first husband died
and her father attempted to hang himself; and after the Doe's divorce, the former
husband married a physically disabled practicing lawyer.' The court issuing the
preliminary injunction concluded that the authors met the "usual standards" for
disguising patient identities,' but professional organizations such as the American
Psychiatric Association argued to the contrary. To these organizations, if a case
study is published without consent, there must be no reasonable likelihood that the
subject can be identified.'82
... See Doe Petition, app. C at 5a, Roe (No. 73-1446).
'78 See APA Brief at 30, Roe (No. 73-1446).
' See Respondent's Brief at 33, Roe (No. 73-1446).
08 See APA Brief at 30, Roe (No. 73-1446); Respondent's Brief at 2, Roe (No. 73-1446).
In addition, the book disclosed that some treatment took place at the psychiatrist's summer
home in Katonah, New York. See id. at 7 n.4.
8 See Doe Petition, app. C at 5a, Roe (No. 73-1446).
182 See APA Brief at 30, Roe (No. 73-1446). According to Dr. Jeremy A. Lazarus,
chairman of the American Psychiatric Association's ethics committee, a patient's right to
confidentiality survives even death. See Alessandra Stanley, Poet Told All; Therapist
Provides the Record, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at Al. This explains the outcry
surrounding Diane Middlebrook's biography of the late poet Anne Sexton. Middlebrook
was granted access to tape recordings and other materials relating to Sexton's therapy with
Dr. Martin Orne. See Martin T. Orne, Foreward to DIANE W. MIDDLEBROOK, ANNE
SEXTON, at xvi-xvii (1991); see also Martin T. Orne, The Sexton Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, July
23, 1991, at A21 (responding to criticism of his decision to release information regarding
Anne Sexton's psychiatric treatment). See generally Sharon Carton, The Poet, the
Biographer and the Shrink: Psychiatrist-Patient Confidentiality and the Anne Sexton
Biography, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 117 (1993) (analyzing the decision to
release information regarding Anne Sexton's psychiatric treatment); Tamar R. Lehrich, To
Bedlam and Part Way Back: Anne Sexton, Her Therapy Tapes, and the Meaning of
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Roe argued that the book was a sufficiently important contribution to medical
knowledge tojustify the breach of the confidential relationship.8 3 The court issuing
the permanent injunction expressed discomfort aboutjudicial competence to evaluate
a book's contribution to scientific knowledge,'14 a curious view given judicial
assessment of elusive matters such as artistic or scientific value in obscenity cases.
More to the point is the court's view that exceptions to confidentiality, such as the
obligation to report gunshot wounds, are not based on the education of the medical
profession." 5 Thus, the court was unwilling to balance the educational value of a
book, based upon a violation of a confidential relationship, against the benefits of
confidentiality. This is a highly defensible position. Few patients, if any, would be
open with their psychiatrist if the remotest prospect of a book loomed in the
background. 6 In addition, the scientific knowledge gleaned by Roe from the
treatment of the Does could have been presented without the extensive identifying
characteristics.
The court issuing the permanent injunction denied that its action was a prior
restraint or "censorship within constitutional meaning."'8 7 The court offered two
reasons to support its conclusion: 1) the book had been published, and 2) it "offend[s]
against the plaintiff's right of privacy, contractual and otherwise, not to have her
innermost thoughts offered to all for the price of this book."'88 The first point is
Privacy, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 165 (1992) (analyzing the debate over the release of
information regarding Anne Sexton's psychiatric treatment as a challenge to conventional
notions of privacy).
"83 See Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 677 (1977).
184 See id. Nonetheless, the court found that the defendants failed to show that the book
was a major contribution to scientific knowledge. See id.
See id.
16 As the American Psychiatric Association stated, an atmosphere of strict
confidentiality is essential to effective mental health therapy:
[Platients in psychotherapy are often required to disclose intimate and
embarrassing acts, thoughts, feelings and fantasies. These revelations include
material that belongs to people's irrational and primitive selves, and which
people often quite appropriately decline to share even with their closest loved
ones. Indeed, some of these matters are so painful to the patient himself that
they have been repressed-i.e., removed from his own conscious memory and
stored in his unconscious. In the therapeutic process this intimate and painful
material is brought to consciousness and articulated only because it is essential
for treatment. If, however, this material were disclosed to family, colleagues or
friends the result would be devastating. Thus, unless assured of absolute
confidentiality, patients will be unwilling to seek the psychotherapeutic
treatment necessary for restoration of mental health.
APA Brief at 3, Roe (No. 73-1446).
' Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
188 Id.
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based upon Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 89 an early obscenity case in which the
Court affirmed a state law allowing an injunction against further distribution of
obscene material.'" In Kingsley Books, Justice Frankfurter distinguished the law at
issue from that which had been ruled invalid in Near v. Minnesota.9 because the
latter involved "censorship," injunctions prohibiting future issues of a newspaper
because past issues had been found scandalous.'92 While the Doe court was correct
in that its injunction was not aimed at material not yet published,'93 it erred in its
claim that state actions seeking to prevent further distribution of published material
are not prior restraints. For example, in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,'94 the Court
found an informal system aimed at preventing further distribution of allegedly
obscene books and magazines to be an impermissible prior restraint.'"
In addition, prior restraint analysis should not be irrelevant because there was a
contractual obligation ofnondisclosure. Although Doe was decided before the Court
developed the "lawfully obtained" doctrine, one could argue that the information
acquired from the patient was only "lawfully acquired" to the extent that the
agreement of nondisclosure was observed. Conceivably, this would mean that any
.time an agreement ofnondisclosure was violated, enforcement of the agreement would
not trigger substantive First Amendment analysis. This approach proves too much;
contracts should be enforced because they comport with public policy, not because
they were made.
Assuming that the injunction is properly categorized as a prior restraint, the
analysis shifts to whether the interest in protecting Doe's privacy justified the
9 354 U.S. 436 (1957). It is a mistake to read Kingsley Books as resting solely on the
fact that the injunction targeted previously published material. As the Court noted in
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), the statute in Kingsley Books had
important procedural safeguards. See id. at 734-38. Furthermore, Kingsley Books is an
obscenity case; the Court regards the social interest in potentially obscene materials to be
less than with political or other forms of social expression. See Carroll v. President and
Commrs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968).
"9 See Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. at 445.
'91 283 U.S. 697 (193 1); see also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
'2 See Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. at 445 (quoting Justice Hughes in Near, 283 U.S. at
713). Furthermore, the speech at issue in Near dealt with public officials rather than
obscenity. See Near, 283 U.S. at 713; see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 726 note * (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (distinguishing between restraints
aimed at allegedly obscene materials and those aimed at speech about government); supra
note 187.
,93 The book was published in February 1973, see Doe Petition at 3, and the injunction
against all distribution pending the outcome of the litigation was issued on June 28, 1973,
see Doe v. Roe, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561 (App. Div. 1973) (per curiam). During this period,
220 copies of the book were sold. See Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
194 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
" See id. at 71-72.
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extraordinary remedy of a permanent injunction. The court in Doe offered an
extensive analysis of the nature and sources of the physician's confidentiality
obligation, "96 and at points touched on the compelling necessity of preserving patient
confidentiality, but seemed satisfied to find a contractual obligation of
confidentiality.' 97 The existence of a contract, however, represents only the beginning
of analysis of questions such as the following: 1) whether violation of the contract
causes irreparable harm that cannot be adequately remedied through less restrictive
methods such as monetary damages or a constructive trust; ? and 2) whether
enforcement of the contract through an injunction, serves an interest of the highest
order. The irreparable harm is readily apparent-revelation of Doe's incestuous
fantasies about her son, for example, would scar their relationship, and public
knowledge of her innermost thoughts would be the most extreme assault on her
dignity.' 99 This case is one of those extraordinary situations where monetary
damages or a constructive trust would do little to compensate for the harm caused by
the breach. Secondly, enforcement ofthe contract would not only benefit Doe, it also
would serve a compelling social interest by encouraging those needing mental therapy
to seek treatment. A candid discussion of the inner-self, including exposure of
repressed or unconscious anti-social thoughts and urges, obviously requires an
expectation of confidentiality. Absent this expectation, prospective patients would
be deterred from seeking treatment, or treatment would be prolonged or ineffective
due to a lack of candor.
An especially intriguing aspect of Doe is the treatment of the psychiatrist's
husband, Peter Poe, who co-authored the book but did not have a contractual
relationship with Doe. The court held that Poe knew that the source of the book
was the patient's production in psychoanalysis. He knew, as well, and
perhaps better than Roe, of the absence of consent, of the failure to
' See Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 671-75.
197 See id. at 675. The court cited two cases involving contractual duties to maintain a
confidence: Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), and United States v.
Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972). Kewanee Oil is a trade secrets case which did
not entail any First Amendment analysis. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 474. Marchetti
involved a CIA secrecy agreement and the Fourth Circuit did little analysis of the breadth
of the agreement restraining disclosure of classified information. See Marchetti, 466 F.2d
at 1316. Although neither case seems directly on point for Doe, one can understand that
a preexisting agreement not to disclose information, without which the information would
not have been obtained, is a factor that helps illuminate the consequences of disclosure.
98 Cf Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (holding that a constructive
trust is an appropriate remedy for a breach of trust by a former CIA employee).
' The court issuing the permanent injunction found that Doe suffered economic loss,
required medical treatment, had insomnia and nightmares, became reclusive, and suffered
acute embarrassment on learning close associates had read the book. See Doe, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 679.
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disguise. If anyone was the actor in seeing to it that the work was written,
that it was manufactured, advertised and circulated, it was Poe. He is a
co-author of the [book] and a willing, indeed avid, co-violator of the
patient's rights and is therefore equally liable."°
This view veers sharply away from contract law and treats Poe as ajoint tortfeasor
in a breach of confidence."' This theory could apply, for example, to a journalist
who received leaked information with the knowledge that the leaker was breaking a
confidential relationship. 202 The tort of breach of confidence is in too rudimentary a
form to justify application to members of the press who publish information with
knowledge that it was originally divulged to the journalist's source under an
expectation of confidentiality. This passage in Doe is best understood as being
limited to the extraordinary circumstance of co-authorship of a book based upon the
most intimate disclosures of personal thoughts that the subjects, and society,
reasonably believed would not be disclosed.
Doe illustrates that the provenance of information should not be the determinative
factor in cases where an injunction against publication is sought. Rather, it is
properly considered only insofar as it clarifies the nature of the interest advanced by
200 Id. at 678.
201 See Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1426, 1449 (1982). For additional analysis of the breach of confidence tort, see Susan
M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedyfor Invasions of Privacy,
43 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1995).
202 In his proposal for a breach of confidence tort, G. Michael Harvey argues that no
obligation of confidentiality should "attach to third parties who receive information subject
to an obligation of confidence, but who have not explicitly assumed this obligation
themselves." G. Michael Harvey, Comment, Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the
Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2430 (1992). Harvey adds that "to hold a
journalist liable depending upon her 'knowledge' of the confidentiality of the information
received from a source would have an impermissible chilling effect upon the publication of
legitimate news." Id. at 243 1. See also Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First
Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1280 (1976) (stating that the values of the First
Amendment would be harmed if its protection "were withdrawn on the ground of
knowledge on the part of the media that the truth had come to light through legally
reprehensible means employed by others."). Both Harvey and Professor Hill are writing
about circumstances where the press receives information with knowledge that the source
is violating an obligation of confidentiality. For commentary on the right of the press to do
more than passively receive information, including the right to induce a source to break a
non-disclosure contract, see Mark J. Chasteen, Comment, In Search of a Smoking Gun:
Tortious Interference with Nondisclosure Agreements as an Obstacle to Newsgathering, 50
FED. COMM. L.J. 483 (1998). For an argument that the publisher as well as the source of
a leak should be liable for invasion of privacy, see Joseph Elford, Note, Trafficking in Stolen




the injunction and the harm stemming from publication. This is not the same
argument as that advanced by the Government in the Pentagon Papers case where
the presence of a so-called illegitimate provenance was an undefined "weight in the
scales."2 °3 The alternate analysis of this Article subsumes the origin of the
information into consideration of the consequences of publication. Thus, the presence
of a contract in Doe does not define by itself whether publication of the book would
cause harm, nor should it be an undefined weight that is primarily a rhetorical facade
for unarticulated premises. Instead, consideration of how the psychiatrist in Doe
acquired the information and the expectations of the parties concerning use of the
information helps answer questions about the consequences of publication.
II. POST-PUBLICATION PENALTIES
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,2" the Court stated that "if a newspaper
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication ofthe information, absent a need
to further a state interest of the highest order."2 This test raised the prospect that
unlawful acquisition of information leaves the press open to punishment for both the
illegal acquisition and the subsequent publication of information.2 6 This begs the
question of what constitutes unlawful acquisition of information. This section first
addresses those instances where the press does no more than merely ask for
information or receives information from a willing source. Second, it addresses those
situations where the press uses technology such as hidden cameras to acquire
information. Both analyses question whether improper acquisition may be linked to
the issues concerning publication.
203 2 PENTAGON PAPERS HISTORY, supra note 33, at 898 (statement of United States
Attorney Whitney North Seymour, Jr., at oral argument before the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit).
204 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
205 Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
206 In Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), the Court noted that this is an open
question. See id. at 535 n.8; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 837 (1978) (noting that the Court was not addressing the applicability of a state law
criminalizing disclosure of judicial misconduct investigations in circumstances where the
information is obtained by illegal means). Professor Edelman has criticized the Daily Mail
test, arguing that, in the privacy context, the "constitutionality of punishing publication
cannot be determined by whether the information is lawfully obtained." Peter B. Edelman,
Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1204
(1990). He suggests that the common law privacy defenses, such as newsworthiness,
provide a better standard for balancing competing interests. See id
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A. Receiving Confidential Information as a Crime
Is it illegal to receive information from a willing source? Does illegality turn on
the reporter's awareness ofa source's obligation notto divulge the information? The
press is the frequent beneficiary of unauthorized leaks of confidential information,
and while the leakers have been subject to criminal prosecutions, 0 7 the press has
rarely been prosecuted for the crime of receiving stolen information. The problems
of prosecuting the press for receiving stolen information are manifest in People v.
Kunkin.20
8
In Kunkin, Gerald Reznick, an employee of the California Attorney General,
removed a copy of a list of the names, home addresses, and telephone numbers of
undercover narcotics agents from the office .2° After Reznick left the employment of
the Attorney General, he took the copy of the list to the Los Angeles Free Press.21 ,
Although a reporter could not promise publication of the list, Reznick left it on the
reporter's desk and asked that his identity not be revealed.2 1 The Free Press
published the list verbatim, along with an editorial decrying secret police. After
publication, the list was returned to the Attorney General's office and Reznick's
fingerprints were found on it.2 3 Reznick was found guilty of violating a state law
concerning theft or removal of government records.211
The state successfully prosecuted the editor and a reporter of the Free Press for
receiving stolen property. 5 Convictions were sustained by the court of appeals,
which concluded that the First Amendment did not bar application of general criminal
laws to information-gathering activities .2 The California Supreme Court reversed
and, without addressing the constitutional questions, concluded that there was
insufficient evidence that the defendants knew the roster was stolen. 7 Reznick
maintained throughout all of his dealings with the Free Press that the roster had to
be returned to him and that the defendants were not aware that Reznick was no longer
207 See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988) (an Espionage Act
prosecution of a government employee who leaked classified defense information to the
press).
208 507 P.2d 1392 (Cal. 1973).
209 See id at 1394.
0 See id
2"' See id.
2.. See id. at 1395.
213 See id.
214 See id. at 1398.
215 See People v. Kunkin, 100 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
216 See id. at 859-60.
217 See Kunkin, 507 P.2d at 1400.
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an employee of the Attorney General and were thus unable to conveniently return the
roster to the Attorney General's office." 8
Although the First Amendment did not color the California Supreme Court's
analysis, there are several features of its decision which reduce the prospect of similar
prosecutions of the press. The court assumed, without deciding, that a copy of the
roster was property within the meaning of the receipt of stolen property statute, but
read the statute as requiring an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the
property.219 Since a copy or an abstract of a document does not deprive the owner
of use of the original, it is highly unlikely that receipt of a copy or abstract would
constitute permanent deprivation.2 The court was unwilling to infer that the
journalists' knew the roster was stolen because they perceived that government
officials would be displeased by publication of its contents.22" ' Finally, the court
referred to the difficulty offitting"journalistic conduct to the elements of a receiving
statute in this or similar circumstances," mentioning that the legislature had recently
enacted a statute punishing the malicious publication of the residential address and
telephone number of a peace officer.222
The enactment of the malicious publication statute reveals the state's real concern
about this information. It seems highly unlikely that the journalists would have been
prosecuted if they had not published the list. The state's readily apparent concern
was Reznick's unauthorized disclosure and the publication of the information, not its
mere receipt.223
218 See id. at 1399.
219 See id. at 1395-96.
220 See FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1990)
("[P]ossession of copies of documents-as opposed to the documents themselves-does not
amount to an interference with the owner's property sufficient to constitute conversion.");
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating
that the unauthorized removal for a short period of time of a literary manuscript, copying
parts of it, and returning it undamaged, is too insubstantial an interference with property
rights to be conversion), revd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Scheetz v. Morning
Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1526 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that a reporter who copied by
hand information from a copy of a confidential police report is not the receiver of stolen
goods).
Of course, information can be treated as property, apart from concerns such as
possession of documents that are raised in conversion or theft cases. See, e.g., Carpenter
v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (involving misappropriation of an employer's
information by an employee).
221 See Kunkin, 507 P.2d at 1399.
222 Id. at 1400 n. 14; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 146(e) (Deering 1997).
223 See Michael E. Tigar, The Right of Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV.
1443, 1462 (1984) (stating that government prosecutions of leakers have "nothing to do
with loss of information: it wants to warn those with access to government files that serious
consequences attend unauthorized use.").
Although journalists who obtained copies of the Pentagon Papers were not prosecuted
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B. Receiving Confidential Information as a Tort
In 1965, James Boyd, then an administrative assistant to United States Senator
Thomas J. Dodd, decided that he would make copies of Dodd's office files and
provide these copies to newspaper columnist Jack Anderson.224 Boyd hoped that the
information in the files would prove that Dodd had engaged in a pattern of unethical
practices.25 Boyd later described this decision in the following manner:
For months the key to Dodd's office, which lay beside my telephone, had
been a daily reminder of what was ahead. Now that moment had come.
To invade Dodd's office and remove his files was an ugly business.
Anderson had always stopped short of recommending it; but there was no
other way to get the proof. I was aware of the ethical questions involved,
if not legal. What about Dodd's right to privacy, the inviolability of a
Senator's official papers, the precept that the end does not justify the
means? ... Rightly or wrongly, I judged that the larger ends ofjustice
would be served by my trespassing in Dodd's office and removing all files
containing evidence of misconduct.,26
The original documents were returned to Dodd's files after copies were made.227
Anderson and his colleague, Drew Pearson, published a series of newspaper columns
about Dodd, resulting in an investigation and censure of Dodd by the Senate.28 Dodd
brought suit for libel, 229 conversion, and invasion of privacy against the columnists,
but not against Boyd and the others who removed and copied the documents. 3
Although the complaint claimed that the columnists instigated or induced the copying
of the documents,23' the district court found only that the columnists knew the
documents had been removed and copied without Dodd's consent.232
A motion for partial summary judgment was heard by Judge Holtzoff, who
authored the Liberty Lobby opinion, which held that the method by which information
under a theory of receipt of stolen property, the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and his
associates raised issues similar to those addressed in Kunkin. For a discussion of these
issues, see Nimmer, supra note 43.
224 See JAMES BOYD, ABOVE THE LAW 104-14 (1968).
225 See id.
226 Id. at 166.
227 See Dodd v. Pearson, 277 F. Supp. 469, 470 (D.D.C. 1967).
228 See S. REP. NO. 90-193 (1967).
.29 After the district court denied Dodd's motion for summary judgment, see Dodd, 277
F. Supp. at 469, Dodd dropped his libel claim. See BOYD, supra note 224, at 200-02.
230 See Dodd, 277 F. Supp. at 470.
231 See id. at 470.
212 See Dodd v. Pearson, 279 F. Supp. 101, 102 (D.D.C. 1968).
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is gathered is irrelevant to prior restraint analysis.233 In Dodd, Holtzoffcast freedom
of the press in pure Blackstonian terms:
Freedom of the press comprizes [sic] freedom to publish ....
Nevertheless, the publisher is subject to the consequences of his act ....
For example, the publication ofa libel may not ordinarily be enjoined, but
having published a defamatory statement, the publisher is subject to an
action for damages. Similarly, freedom of the press does not comprize
[sic] an unrestrained and untrammeled right of access to sources of
information for use in publication."'
To Judge Holtzoff, Dodd's former employees were guilty of trespass and
conversion."' Thejournalists were also guilty of conversion because they received
and used Dodd's property with knowledge that it had been wrongfully obtained.236
Judge Holtzoff apparently assumed that the content of the documents was Dodd's
property; the fact that copies and not originals were at issue was considered to be
immaterial. Yet, the conversion cases cited by Holtzoff all involved actions either
permanently or seriously depriving the owner of use of the property in question.237
As to Dodd's claim that thejournalists invaded his privacy, Judge Holtzoffruled that
publication of information relating to a Senator's activities was a matter of public
interest.238
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia sustained the lower court's
ruling on privacy, but reversed on conversion.239 Publication of information about
Dodd's fitness for office was a "paradigm example" of speech that was a matter of
public interest.240 Nor was the mere receipt of the information, with knowledge that
it had been obtained without Dodd's consent, sufficient to establish joint liability for
the branch of privacy known as intrusion. Judge Skelly Wright wrote:
A person approached by an eavesdropper with an, offer to share
information gathered through the eavesdropping would perhaps play the
233 See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 261 F. Supp. 726 (D.D.C. 1966); see also supra
notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
234 Dodd, 279 F. Supp. at 103.
235 See id. at 104.
236 See id. The value of the information was to be determined at trial, along with whether
Dodd could recover for embarrassment and mental anguish under the conversion tort. See
id. at 105-06.
237 See id. at 104 (citing cases involving conversion of a scow, a ship, timber, and stock
certificates).
238 See id. at 105.
239 See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
240 See id. at 703.
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nobler part should he spurn the offer and shut his ears. However, it seems
to us that at this point it would place too great a strain on human
weakness to hold one liable in damages who merely succumbs to
temptation and listens. 4'
Significantly, Wright stated that there was no connection between the public
disclosure and intrusion branches of privacy; public disclosure actions did not depend
upon the manner in which the information was obtained and intrusion actions did not
depend upon the content or publication of material obtained through actions such as
eavesdropping. 242
Unlike the district court, the court of appeals approached Dodd's conversion
claim by examining the nature of the information to determine if it was property
protected by the law of conversion.243 The information, in the form of office records
and letters, was not a literary work, scientific invention, nor material whose economic
value depends upon being kept secret. Consequently, it was not regarded as property
under the law ofconversion.2 4 Moreover, since conversion requires either complete
or very substantial deprivation of possession of property,24 the photocopying of
Dodd's files did not fit the contours of the tort. Those documents were removed from
the files at night, photocopied, and returned to the files undamaged before office
operations resumed in the morning. Insofar as the documents' value to appellee
resided in their usefulness as records of the business of his office, appellee was
clearly not substantially deprived of his use of them.246
241 Id. at 705.
242 See id.; see also id, at 704 ("The tort [of intrusion] is completed with the obtaining
of the information by improperly intrusive means."); id. at 705 (stating that "injuries from
intrusion and injuries from publication should be kept clearly separate"). Professor Andrew
McClurg argues that dissemination of information is a factor to be considered in analysis
of intrusion cases. See Andrew J. McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort
Theory ofLiability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REv. 989, 1070-78 (1995).
For criticism of McClurg's approach on the grounds that it would single out individuals
engaged in expressive activity, see Note, Privacy, Photography, and the Press, 111 HARV.
L. REv. 1086, 1091-94 (1998).
243 See Pearson, 410 F.2d at 706 n.23.
244 See id. at 707-08.
245 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 A.
246 See Pearson, 410 F.2d. at 707. Assuming that the information in Dodd's files had
been protected by conversion, and assuming that Boyd and Anderson had received the
originals, they would have been liable for conversion even though they did not take the
files. See FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that although ABC was not directly responsible for the loss of FMC's documents,




The injuries for which Dodd sought compensation, such as harm to reputation,
were the result of publication of the information; efforts to use either conversion or
intrusion as a link to this type of damage are strained. The court of appeals ruled that
injuries of this type are properly addressed through an action such as defamation
where liability "can be established underthe limitations created by common law and
by the Constitution. 247
Although the court of appeals decision is based upon tort law principles,248 one
can easily foresee the harm to constitutional values if the press were liable for torts
such as intrusion or conversion merely for receiving information taken improperly by
others. The case rests upon the important factual finding that the journalists did not
induce the copying of the documents. This Article now turns to the question of
whether ajournalist's request for information, even with awareness of the source's
confidentiality obligations, is tortious or criminal.
C. "Simply" Asking for Information
1. Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers
California law requires the Governorto submit the names of all potential judicial
appointees or nominees to ajudicial qualifications commission; evaluations of this
commission are required to be confidential. 49 In July 1983, two newspapers
published the commission's conclusion that George Nicholson, a recently
unsuccessful candidate for Attorney General, was unqualified forjudicial office.25
Nicholson filed suit alleging that the information was acquired through intrusion,
thereby making publication illegal."' The media defendants demurred to the
complaint on the ground that the publication was privileged under the First
Amendment; the trial court sustained the demurrers. 2 The court of appeals
affirmed.253
Nicholson claimed he had an expectation that the commission's negative
evaluation would remain confidential and its disclosure to the press was illegal. 54
This case closely resembled Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia.5 and the
247 Pearson, 410 F.2d at 708.
248 Judge Wright indicated that because the publication was protected under common law
principles, he did not reach constitutional questions. See id. at 703 n.6.
249 See Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 177 Cal. App.3d 509, 5 12-13 (1986).
250 See id at 512.
251 See id. at 514.
252 See id. at 514 n.1.
253 See id at 521.
254 See id at 516.
255 435 U.S. 829 (1978). In Landmark Communications, the record was silent on the
manner in which the newspaper acquired the information about the judicial commission's
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state court of appeals concluded that the state could not impose liability upon a
nonparticipant for the breach ofconfidentiality.256 However, Nicholson claimed that
the press instigated the breach by "soliciting, inquiring, requesting and persuading"
members of the commission to disclose the evaluation. 2" The court of appeals
acknowledged that the press had no immunity for crimes or torts committed during
the course of newsgathering, but believed that newsgathering was protected to the
extent that it "involve[d] 'routine. . . reporting techniques." 258 "Such techniques, of
course, include asking persons questions, including those with confidential or
restricted information., 259 The court of appeals acknowledged that the government
may seek to preserve confidentiality by imposing a duty upon commission
participants, but it may not impose liability upon the press for publishing material it
obtained merely by asking for it.260
This opinion indicates that even when the press knows a potential source is under
an obligation of confidentiality, merely asking for information is not illegal. This also
means potential sources alone bear the burden of legal consequences for their breach
of confidentiality, while the press is free to ask for information. Yet, what activities
go beyond simply asking? The circuit court of appeals used the circumstances in
Dietemann v. Time, Inc.26 and Galella v. Onassis262 as illustrations of impermissible
information gathering. Dietemann involved subterfuge and technology such as
hidden cameras and microphones. 263 Galella entailed constant surveillance by a
photographer, including actions such as bumping into Mrs. Onassis and her
children. 264 This presents the issue of whetherthere is a ground between the extremes
of merely asking and using hidden cameras where the actions of the reporter can also
be considered illegal.
inquiry. See Landmark Communications, 223 S.E.2d 120, 123 n.4 (Va. 1977), rev 'd, 435
U.S. 829 (1978).
256 See Nicholson, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 518.
257 Id. at 520.
258 Id. at 519. (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)
(omission in original)). The court of appeals also used as synonyms "normal news-
gathering activities," id at 520, and "ordinary reporting techniques," id. at 521 n.6.
259 Id. at 519.
260 See id. at 519-20; see also Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press, " 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,
636 (1975) ("So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish what it
knows, and may seek to learn what it can.").
26' 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); see also infra notes 319-44 and accompanying text.
262 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
263 See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 245.
264 See Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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2. Scheetz v. Morning Call
Shortly after Kenneth Scheetz was named "Officer ofthe Year" of the Allentown,
Pennsylvania Police Department, the MorningCall published an article revealing that
Scheetz's wife had accused him of assault, but that police had not conducted an
investigation.265 The details of the assault were based upon information contained in
police reports acquired from a confidential source by a reporter, Terry Mutchler.266
The reports were not considered public records under Pennsylvania law,267 and
Mutchler was denied access to them by the chief of police.268 Mutchler then asked
several sources within the police department if they had access to the reports, and one
source showed her originals which she copied by hand.269 The Scheetzes filed suit
against the newspaper, the reporter, and the unnamed source, contending that the
newspaper and its reporter had conspired with a state actor to deprive the plaintiffs'
of their constitutional right to privacy.27 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the newspaper and reporter's motion for
summary judgment,27' and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.272
District Court Judge Cahn ruled that the publication dealt with matters at the core
of the First Amendment's protection, while most of the facts raised only modest
privacy interests.273 Because the only evidence before the court was the reporter's
affidavit, the court was able to conclude only that the evidence suggested no crime
had been committed in gathering the information.274 Nonetheless, Judge Cahn's
comments about information gathering are troubling. The plaintiffs argued that civil
sanctions can be imposed when the press publishes unlawfully obtained truthful
information. 2" Judge Cahn acknowledged that the Supreme Court had not resolved
the issue, but concluded that the press did not have absolute protection to publish
truthful information that was unlawfully obtained.276 After noting that those who
supply confidential information to the press can be criminally prosecuted, Judge Cahn
added the following:
265 The article and a follow-up story appear as appendices to the district court's opinion.
See Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1536-40 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
266 See id at 1517.
267 See id. at 1531.
268 See id. at 1517.
269 See id. at 1526.
270 See id. at 1517.
211 See id. at 1526.
272 See Sheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202 (3rd Cir. 1991).
273 See Sheetz, 747 F. Supp. at 1535.
274 See id. at 1525.
275 See id
276 See id. Judge Cahn's position was based in part on a reading of the opinions in the
Pentagon Papers case, from which he gleaned that the Court "would probably have upheld
a statute making illegal the publication of information unlawfully obtained." Id. at 1524.
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There is a distinction between punishing an individual who breaks the law
in order that a story may be published and punishing the publisher who
prints the story, knowing the information to have been obtained
unlawfully. There is also a distinction in the criminal law between thieves
and receivers of stolen goods, but both are criminals. This court does not
mean to say that the media are liable to the same degree as those who act
improperly for it, or those who supply it with improperly obtained-
material. But the distinctions are of degree, not of kind.277
The beginning of this passage recognizes the difference between punishing both
sources who break obligations of confidentiality and the press for publishing that
... Id. at 1525 n. 15. Judge Cahn's views may be contrasted with those of Judge Thomas
Hogan of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia who concluded that
"information, even if initially garnered through illegal means, is lawfully obtained by
anyone who did not himself break the law to obtain it." Boehner v. McDermott, No. 98-594,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11509, at * 14 (D.D.C. July 27, 1998). In Boehner, Representative
James McDermott received from John and Alice Martin a tape recording they made of a
cellular telephone call involving several House Republican leaders. McDermott leaked the
tape to the New York Times which published its contents. See Adam Clymer, Gingrich Is
Heard Urging Tactics in Ethics Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1997, at Al. The Martins pled
guilty to charges of violating federal law prohibiting the interception of cellular telephone
calls, and Representative John Boehner, one of the parties to the telephone conversation,
sued McDermott for disclosing the tape. Although Judge Hogan expressed concern about
criminals laundering illegally intercepted information, see Boehner, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11509, at *10, he ruled that McDermott lawfully obtained the tape. See id. at *12.
Furthermore, he found that Boehner's privacy interest was insufficient to override
McDermott's First Amendment right to disclose the tape. See id. at *21-23.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently reversed the
judgment, concluding that the First Amendment did not protect McDermott's actions. See
Boehner v. McDermott, No. 98-7156, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23135 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24,
1999). The court of appeals distinguished between the newspaper's actions, which it labeled
"speech" and McDermott's disclosure, which it labeled "conduct." Id. at *45. By "accepting
the tape from the Martins, McDermott participated in their illegal conduct." Id. at *40.
Circuit Justice Sentelle dissented because the distinction drawn by the majority was
"without substance or force." Id. at *67 (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting). He added, "as the court
holds today that the state can punish the release by McDermott based on the manner in
which his source obtained that information, in a later day the state can burden the
publishers of newspapers... on the same basis." Id. at *66.
Although the New York Times, was not a defendant in Boehner, the court of appeals
noted that it was not concerned with whether the statute could be constitutionally applied
to newspapers who published stories about the illegally-intercepted conference call. See
Boehner, 1999 U.S. App. 23135 at * 12, *45. For a claim that the First Amendment protects
the newspaper's action, see Victor A. Kovner, Not Whom You Tell, But How You Know,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 10, 1997, at A19.
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information, a distinction at the heart of the decision in Landmark Communications.
The latter part of this passage is troublesome for its suggestion that the press can be
categorized as a receiver of stolen goods when it obtains information from a source.
Forthe reasons discussed in Kunkin, fitting journalistic conduct into receipt of stolen
property is difficult. Most importantly, if receipt of information is improper, then
under the district court's view, publication of the information is potentially illegal.
This exemplifies the problem of linking information gathering with publication
issues-if improper information gathering is defined in terms such as receipt of
confidential information, then a wide array of material, the publication of which
serves First Amendment values, will no longer be protected.
The Third Circuit affirmed Scheetz on the grounds that the information was not
protected by the confidentiality branch of the constitutional right of privacy; Mrs.
Scheetz had no reasonable expectation that the information she provided to police
would remain secret:.. Judge Mansmann dissented, and would have remanded to
determine if the newspaper unlawfully acquired the information.27 9 Although Judge
Mansmann admitted thatthe Supreme Court's cases provide little guidance as to how
to factor unlawful acquisition into First Amendment analysis, she concluded that
unlawful acquisition would mandate a finding for the plaintiffs.2"' She called
unlawful acquisition a "bright line" test which would provide clear guidance to
journalists as to what could be published without the fear of legal sanction.2", To the
contrary, Judge Mansmann's vague definition of unlawful acquisition is likely to
trigger a significant chilling effect. For example, Judge Mansmann was troubled by
the newspaper's disclosure that the couple had received marital counseling, a fact
obtained from the confidential police materials.28 2 Yet, Judge Mansmann believed
that it would have been lawful for the press to interview sources to whom the
Scheetzes had confided this information.28 a She indicated that "[c]onfiding in one's
friends, family, or religious leader, for example, would not suffice to diminish a
reasonable expectation of privacy against disclosure to the public at large."2 4 It is
difficult to understand how a reporter's questioning of family members, whom the
Scheetzes expected would preserve confidentiality, would be legal while asking a
source to show a set of documents is illegal. Furthermore, Judge Mansmann reasoned
that because the reporter was aware of the confidential nature of the r eports and the
fact that the Chief of Police regarded them as "stolen," the reports were unlawfully
278 See Sheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 207 (3rd Cir. 1991).
279 See id. at 212 (Mansmann, C.J., dissenting).
280 See id. at 212-14 (Mansmann, C.J., dissenting).
28' See id. at 214 (Mansmann, C.J., dissenting).
282 See Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1532 (1990).
283 See Sheetz, 946 F.2d at 209-10 (Mansmann, C.J., dissenting).
284 Id. at 209 (Mansmann, C.J., dissenting).
1999]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
acquired. 285 An official's displeasure with a leak, and a reporter's awareness of
confidentiality are insufficient conditions to establish illegal newsgathering.
3. Ashcraft v. Conoco
On August 26, 1997, Conoco agreed to settle a lawsuit brought by 178 residents
of a mobile home park who claimed that a leak at a Conoco gasoline facility
contaminated their drinking water.286 The terms of the settlement were not publicly
announced, and on September 22, the court entered an order sealing the settlement
agreement.28 7 Cory Reiss, a reporter for the Wilmington, North Carolina, Morning
Star, who had been covering the lawsuit, began canvassing the mobile home residents,
seeking to "induce someone to violate the court's order." '88 Reiss' efforts were
successful; two sources agreed to reveal the terms of the settlement on condition of
anonymity.29 On October 15, the Morning Star reported, under Reiss' byline, that
Conoco had agreed to settle the case for $36 million. 2"
If the Morning Star had published the article based solely upon Reiss'
confidential sources, it is highly unlikely that any legal action would have resulted
against the newspaper.29' The editors set in motion, however, a unique legal action
when they inserted the following sentence in Reiss' article: "A document confirming
the settlement amount was among public documents given to aMorningStar reporter
Tuesday by a clerk at the federal courthouse in Raleigh."292 This sentence, which
Judge Earl Britt regarded as adding "the imprimatur of the court's credibility" to the
paper's anonymous sources, 29 3 resulted in a $500,000 fine for civil contempt of court
28. See id. at 213. (Mansmann, C.J., dissenting). The Chief of Police's comments about
the documents appear in the Morning Call's initial story about the Scheetzes. See Scheetz
747 F. Supp. at 1537-38.
286 See Cory Reiss, The Conoco Settlement $36 Million, WILMINGTON MORNING STAR,
Oct. 15, 1997, at IA.
287 Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., No. 7:95-CV-187-BR(3), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092, at
*9-10 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 1998).
28 Id. at *15.
289 See id at * 8.
290 See Reiss, supra note 286, at IA.
291 Judge Britt stated, "Had the Morning Star printed only Reiss' story, without the
paragraph 'confirming' the agreement from sealed court documents, it would not have
violated any order of this court." Ashcraft, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092, at *24-25; see also
id at *20 (stating that if the newspaper had stuck with the original disclosure by the
unnamed sources, "this matter might never have reached this stage"). Reiss was
subsequently ordered by Judge Britt to identify his sources. See Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc.,
No. 7:95-CV-187-BR(3), 1998 U.S, Dist. LEXIS 16371, at *12-13 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 3,
1998).
292 Reiss, supra note 286, at IA.
293 Ashcraft, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092, at *20.
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against the newspaper and a reporter, Kirsten Mitchell, who was inadvertently given
the sealed settlement agreement by a deputy clerk.294
Mitchell, the Raleigh Bureau Chief for the Morning Star, was asked by her
editors on October 14 to visit the court clerk's office to review the Conoco case
documents that had been filed since the settlement.295 The deputy court clerk brought
a stack of documents to the counter, and before handing them to Mitchell, pulled a
brown envelope from the stack, stating, "You can't have this, this is a sealed
document."'2 96 Within the stack of materials provided to Mitchell was a white
envelope containing the judge's September 22 sealing order, clipped on top of the
settlement agreement. The front of the envelope had the following warning:
CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
FILED UNDER SEAL
TO BE OPENED ONLY BY THE COURT2 97
The back of the envelope had a flap with a cellophane window in which the word
"OPENED" appeared.298 Adjacent to the flap appeared the following: "Caution: The
word "OPENED" appears in the window panel to indicate that the envelope has been
opened., '2 9 Although the envelope had been opened several times before it was
provided to Mitchell, its flap was sealed when she received it.3" Mitchell opened the
envelope and on the fourth page discovered the settlement amount."a ' She informed
an editor of the amount, adding that it came from a document that was sealed or had
previously been sealed.30 2
Shortly after Mitchell's visit to the clerk's office, Reiss telephoned one of the
plaintiff's attorneys and a Conoco public affairs officer, revealing the amount of the
294 Mitchell was also found guilty of criminal contempt and fined another $1000. See
John Gibeaut, Secret Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1998, at 50. Attorney fees and costs were
added to the civil judgment, bringing the amount to $599,68 1. See Appellants' Brief at 5,
Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., No. 98-1212(L) (4th Cir. filed Apr. 30, 1998). See generally Amy
Singer, The Envelope, Please, AM. LAW., June 1998, at 66 [hereinafter Singer, Envelope].
295 See Ashcraft, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092, at * 11.
296 Id. at * 12.
297 Id. at *10.
298 See id.
I"9 Id. at *10-11.
'oo See id. at * 12. Some press accounts of the case claim that the envelope's flap was
open when it was received by Mitchell. See Lee Hickling, The Unsealed Envelope: A First
Amendment Fight, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar/Apr. 1998, at 12. This account is
contrary to the judge's finding of facts and the appellants did not claim in their brief that
the envelope was open. See Appellant's Brief at 7-8, Ashcraft (No. 98-1212(L)).
301 See Ashcrafl, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092, at * 12.
302 See id, at * 13.
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settlement agreement and asking for comment. a3 On the evening of October 14, three
of the plaintiff's attorneys spoke with a Morning Star editor and informed him that
the settlement amount was under seal.30 4 After consulting with the newspaper
company's in-house attorney, the editor inserted the sentence about public documents
confirming the settlement amount into Reiss' story.30 5
The district court's decision to find Mitchell and the Morning Star in contempt
is confusing. There are three possible bases for this action. First, Mitchell violated
the confidentiality order by opening and reading the contents of the sealed envelope.
For example, the court stated, "The file containing that agreement was, until
otherwise ordered, for the eyes of the court only. Mitchell opened it. That act, not
her speech, is the subject of this order."306 The problem with this approach is that
Mitchell would be in contempt even if she never disclosed the settlement terms to her
editor or anyone else. Thus, a second basis for the decision is that Mitchell violated
the confidentiality order by telling her editor what she found at the courthouse. The
district court stated that "when Mitchell read the settlement anddisclosed its contents
to her editor, she violated the court's express directive to maintain the agreement
under seal."' However, if the Morning Star's editors had decided not to attribute
the settlement amount to the court document, it is difficult to perceive how Conoco
would be harmed by a communication that is part of a newspaper's internal editorial
decision-making process. Because the district court assessed damages based upon
the increased costs Conoco would incur defending similar cases as a result of the
publication of the settlement agreement, °8 it is unlikely that the court was truly
concerned about Mitchell reading the settlement agreement and telling her editor
about it. Also, because disclosed the settlement terms with attribution solely to
Reiss's confidential sources, the court was not properly concerned with mere
disclosure. Finally, a third possible basis for the decision is the newspaper's
attribution of the settlement amount to the court document. The court stated that
when the newspaper "printed this information and attributed it to a court document
that was under seal," it subjected itself to contempt.30 9 In addition, the most telling
comment is the court's statement that the attribution to the court document added
"greater weight and credibility" to the newspaper's story, thus enhancing the damage
0'3 See Singer, Envelope, supra note 294, at 67.
" See id.
305 See id.
1o6 Ashcrafl, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092, at *22; see also id. at *18 ("No one was
permitted by law to read or even skim the documents."); id. at * 19 ("Mitchell ... took the
affirmative step of opening a sealed document.").
310 Id. at * 17-18 (emphasis added).
308 See id. at *31-32.
309 Id. at *25.
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to Conoco.3"' Yet, according to the district court's reasoning, attribution to the court
document can only be illegal if the document was improperly obtained."a '
Whether Mitchell's actions were illegal depends upon how two significant facts
are viewed. The first fact is that the court clerk inadvertently gave Mitchell the
settlement document. The other is Mitchell's awareness of the sealing order before
she disclosed the contents of the agreement to her editors."a 2 If one believes that the
constitutionally significant fact is that Mitchell acquired the settlement agreement
from the clerk, then her awareness of the sealing order becomes irrelevant. By
contrast, if one believes that Mitchell's awareness ofthe sealing order is paramount,
then the fact that she received the document from the clerk becomes less important.3"'
Treating the acquisition of the information from the clerk as the key fact yields the
following observations. First, this position rests upon the somewhat startling premise
that bureaucratic mistakes completely erode the government's interest in secrecy."a 4
310 Id. at *20.
3' See id. at *24 ("The inescapable facts are that the newspapers' employee intentionally
violated the terms of a known court order and that the newspaper itself knowingly published
information obtained in violation of that order.").
31' Whether or not Mitchell saw the warning on the exterior of the envelope before she
opened it is disputed by the parties. See Appellants' Brief at 37, Ashcraft (No. 98-1212 (L)
(stating that at the time she opened the envelope, Mitchell had no information that it was
confidential); Appellee's Brief at 4 n. 1, Ashcraft No. 98-1212(L) (describing Mitchell's
tesiimony that she did not see the warnings before opening the envelope as "self-serving").
However, Mitchell's admission that the sealing order was the first thing that one would see
after opening the envelope, and her statement to her editor, indicate that she was aware of
the seal.
311 It should be no surprise, then, that the appellants emphasize Mitchell's acquisition
of the document from the clerk, see Appellants' Brief at 37, Ashcraft (No. 98-1212 (L)
(arguing that the constitutionally significant event was the handing of the envelope to
Mitchell by the clerk, not her opening of it), while the appellees emphasize her awareness
of the seal, see Appellees' Brief at 22-27 Ashcrafi (No. 98-1212 (L) (discussing proof that
Mitchell had actual notice and constructive knowledge of the sealing order).
314 Professor Edelman's discussion of Florida Star concluded that it is absurd to allow
bureaucratic mistakes to nullify an interest in confidentiality. See Edelman, supra note 206,
at 1203. He cited administrative law cases for the proposition that the government is not
bound by mistakes made by low-level bureaucrats. See id. at 1203 n.55. But see Boettger
v. Loverro, 587 A.2d 712, 718 (Pa. 1991) (stating that assistant district attorney's filing of
wiretap transcript with court clerk, in violation of state law, meant that the transcript was
"in the public domain, irrespective of whether or not the action of the assistant district
attorney was inadvertent").
Recently, a court clerk in the Los Angeles Superior Court inadvertently allowed a
reporter for the Los Angeles Daily Journal to see a sealed document relating to an insurance
fraud lawsuit. After the reporter prepared a story, a restraining order was issued. See Judge
Blocks Story About Sealed Suit, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 17, 1999, at 4. Another judge
lifted the order a few days later. See Judge Lifts Order Blocking Story About Sealed
Insurance Lawsuit, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 18, 1999, at 4.
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Because the press and government are adversaries, one of the central rules of
engagement is that the government may "guard mightily" against leaks, "yet must
suffer them if they occur." ' 5 Second, there is a bright line test to guide reporters;
if truthful information is made available intentionally or inadvertently by a
government official, it may be published regardless of its government classification.
Placing paramount importance on the reporter's awareness of the seal brings the
following observations to the foreground. First, the awareness factor must be
confined by geography and source, such as obtaining the document from the clerk at
the courthouse.3"6 Otherwise, a reporter's awareness ofa seal unacceptably expands
a court's contempt power to reach the press in situations such as those in which an
attorney leaks a sealed document to a reporter. Second, even when confined by
geography and source, awareness of a seal does not create a bright line. Reporters
may not fully understand the legal restrictions on information they receive from
government officials. For example, a reporter may not know whether the seal is
binding only upon the parties and court personnel." 7 Another question is whether
notice of the government's classification imposes an obligation upon a reporter to
ascertain whether publication is permissible."' An answer to whether the press
should be so burdened is suggested by Florida Star v. BJF a9 in which the Court
feared a chilling effect would occur from the "onerous obligation" the press would
have in defining which information obtained from the government could be lawfully
published.32
3 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80 (1975).
316 The peculiarity of the Ashcraft case is illustrated by changing its facts slightly.
Consider how the outcome might have changed if instead of reviewing the documents in
the courthouse, Mitchell had telephoned the court clerk and asked for photocopies to be
made and mailed to her. Inadvertently or deliberately, a copy of the sealing order and the
settlement agreement are mailed to Mitchell. Even with awareness of the court order on
behalf of Mitchell and her editors, it is difficult to believe the court's contempt power would
extend to a nonparty in this circumstance. See Appellee United States' Brief at 6-7 & 11-12,
Ashcraft (No. 98-1212(L)) (emphasizing the court's power to control what occurs within
the courthouse).
117 The appellants argued that the sealing order was not applicable to Mitchell and the
newspaper, see Appellants' Brief at 13-14, Ashcrafl (No. 98-1212 (L)), while the appellees
claimed that the court's order applied to anyone who inspected the court's files, see
Appellees' Brief at 14-17, Ashcrafl (No. 98-1212 (L)).
318 Based on her experience from a prior case in which her newspaper sought to have a
settlement agreement unsealed, Mitchell was familiar with the procedure for unsealing
documents. See Ashcraft, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092, at * 12. While the motion to seal
and the sealing order were among the documents provided to Mitchell, neither she nor her
editors sought to determine if an unsealing order had been issued. See id. at * 13, *22.
319 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
320 See id. at 536.
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There is an additional factor from Florida Star that guides the appropriate
outcome of this case. In Florida Star, the Court stated, "Where information is
entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than punishing truthful publication
almost always exists for guarding against the dissemination of private facts."32"' The
less drastic method requires the government to focus on its internal procedures for
safeguarding information in its custody. This line between secrecy and openness in
the affairs of government was concisely drawn by Justice Stewart in Landmark
Communications: "Though government may deny access to information and punish
its theft, government may not prohibit or punish the publication of that information
once it falls into the hands of the press .... 322
Judge Britt felt that "[t]o absolve Mitchell of civil contempt would afford her
special treatment merely because of her media status. 323 Yet, this case does not have
to be viewed as resting upon any special rights for the press; instead, anyone who
obtains information from court files is free to disseminate that information. Just as
reporters have no greater right of access to the information in possession of the
government than do other citizens, the press has no greater right to disseminate that
information once it is obtained.
One of the disturbing aspects of Ashcraft is the linkage between the right to
publish and the method of information gathering. Conceptually, this Article questions
why these two should be linked. For example, the right to publish should not
immunize the antecedent acts of information gathering. If this makes sense, the act
of information gathering should not affect the right to publish. It is a far stretch to
regard the damage Conoco suffered by attribution to the document as categorically
different from the damage that would have been suffered without attribution. Thus,
this is really a case about harm from publication. That is to say, whether the nature
of the source really affects the harm suffered. For example, assume Mitchell had
asked the court clerk for the amount of the settlement (as Reiss had done with the
plaintiffs), and the paper had added, "An informed source at the courthouse
confirmed the settlement amount." Would the paper's attribution constitute
contempt? In this hypothetical case, to regard the journalist as liable for the clerk's
breach of duty turns Landmark Communications on its head.
32! Id. at 534. The Court added:
To the extent sensitive information is in the government's custody, it has even
greater power to forestall or mitigate the injury caused by its release. The
government may classify certain information, establish and enforce procedures
ensuring its redacted release, and extend a damages remedy against the
government or its officials where the government's mishandling of sensitive
information leads to its dissemination.
Id.
322 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 849 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
323 Ashcraft, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092, at *21.
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D. Acquiring the Information Improperly
There are consequences when the press does more than ask for information. It
is clear that illegal information gathering, by itself, is actionable without any element
of publication.324 The question is whether illegal information gathering affects the
protection afforded the publication of that information.
1. Dietemann v. Time, Inc.
Life magazine arranged with police officials that its employees would visit
Antone Dietemann's home, where he was suspected of practicing medicine without
a license.325 Life agreed that the information it gathered could be used in a criminal
prosecution, and later published by-the magazine.326 Two Life magazine employees
gained entrance to the home through a ruse, claiming they were sent there by a Mr.
Johnson.327 During the course of Dietemann's examination of Jackie Metcalf, the
female employee ofLife, Bill Ray, aLife photographer posing as Metcalf's husband,
used a concealed camera to take photographs.328 Metcalf had a transmitter hidden in
her purse and her conversation with Dietemann was transmitted to a parked car where
it was recorded.3 29 Dietemann was later arrested for practicing medicine without a
license.33 °
Subsequently, Life published an article entitled, "Crackdown on Quackery,"
which discussed three criminal investigations, including that of Dietemann.33' In the
portion of the article dealing with Dietemann, two photographs were published. One,
taken outside Dietemann's home, showed him at the time of his arrest.33 2 The second
photograph, taken inside the home, showed Dietemann with his left hand on Metcalf s
breast while "waving his magic wand with his right hand over an array of bottles that
324 See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that a
photographer's harassment was unprotected by the First Amendment); Wolfson v. Lewis,
924 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that harassing conduct by a television news
crew was unprotected by the First Amendment); cf United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp.
149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that trespass by a television news crew affected analysis of
whether broadcaster must surrender tape of police search).
325 See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 927 (C.D. Cal 1968), aff'd, 449 F.2d










contain body tissues." '333 The accompanying text further described Dietemann's
procedure:
"I told him I had a lump in my breast," says Mrs. Metcalf. "He began
beating that wand and rubbing me. He finally decided I had butter
poisoning because I ate rancid butter exactly I 1 years, nine months and
seven days ago. The poison settled in my leg, causing the lump in my
breast. He gave me some clay pills for it."
The practitioners of quackery range all the way from out-and-out
charlatans like Dietemann to those with a facade of respectability. But
whatever their spiel and however implausible their claims, they seem to
have no trouble finding eager patients willing to lay their money on the
line. But the greatest harm quacks do is not monetary. By raising false
hopes, they often keep patients from being treated by competent
doctors.334
Dietemann brought suit for invasion of privacy. 33  Two distinct privacy
questions were presented in the case: whether the information-gathering methods
were intrusive; and whether the publication disclosed private facts of a highly
embarrassing nature." In its murky analysis of these claims, the district court
apparently concluded that because the information was improperly obtained,
publication was also improper. The district court was troubled by the subterfuge
used to gain entrance to the home and the use of hidden cameras and microphones.337
News relating to criminal charges could be disseminated once it became a matter of
public record, but the press could not "prepare a dossier on persons by illegal means
.. then await a prosecution and publish everything which might in some degree
relate to the offense charged ....
The district court awarded Dietemann $1,000 for"injury to his feelings and peace
of mind., 339 The court did not segregate the harm from publication and intrusion;
instead, it stated that the publication of the "plaintiff's picture taken without his
333 id.
334 Id. at 77.
331 See Dietemann, 284 F. Supp. at 927-28.
336 See id at 930-32.
137 See id. at 930-31.
131 Id. at 931.
133 Id. at 932. But see Marks v. Bell Telephone Co., 331 A.2d 424, 433 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
1975) (Pomeroy, J., concurring) ("The tort of intrusion is designed to protect an individual,
not against what other human beings may know or think of him, but rather against the very
act of interfering with his seclusion."); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383,
392, 398 (1960) (describing the interest protected in intrusion cases as a mental one, while
the interest in public disclosure actions is reputation).
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consent in his home"justified the award of damages. ° The district court refused to
award punitive damages, however, because Life's efforts were "directed toward the
elimination of quackery, an evil which has visited great harm upon a great number
of gullible people."34' This passage is significant because it rests upon a distinction
between intrusion to satisfy mere curiosity and intrusion motivated by a desire to
expose criminal or socially harmful activity. The extremely modest size of the
general damages award may have'been influenced by the social value of disclosing
Dietemann's criminal activities. However, if punitive damages were disallowed
because of the value of disclosure, then any amount of damages for harm caused by
publication should be questioned. A cleaner analysis would segregate the
newsgathering issues from publication issues; where publication is a matter of public
interest, no damages tied to the effect of the publication should be allowed. This
analysis continues to allow awards for harm suffered, from intrusive acts as such
awards pose little danger to First Amendment interests because they rarely occur and
generally have been minuscule in amount.342
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, but unlike the trial court, the appellate court was
untroubled by the subterfuge used to gain entry into Dietemann's home. Dietemann's
reasonable privacy expectation was only that "eavesdropping" newsmen would not
invade his home with hidden cameras and electronic devices.343 Interestingly, the
court of appeals treated the action by the reporters, who were participants in
conversation with Dietemann, as akin to actions by third parties who place electronic
bugs in bedrooms, hospital rooms, or in telephones.344 In addition, the appellate court
accepted the trial court's characterization of Dietemann's home as a private place,
despite precedent indicating that the offering of an illegal service substantially
diminishes a homeowner's expectation of privacy.345
340 Dietemann, 284 F. Supp. at 932. But see Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307, 310
(W.D. Pa. 1992) (stating in regards to a public disclosure claim, "It matters not, in our
judgment, that the information and photograph may have been obtained illegally,
unethically or deceptively by the reporter.").
14 Dietemann, 284 F. Supp. at 933.
342 See REX HEINKE, MEDIA LAW 198 (1994).
343 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). By implication, if the
reporters had used subterfuge, but had not used the hidden devices, there would have been
no intrusion. See id. ("One who invites another to his home or office takes a risk that the
visitor may not be what he seems, and that the visitor may repeat all he hears and observes
when he leaves.").
'44 See id. at 247-48 (citing cases involving intrusive acts by nonparticipants to
conversations).
141 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (noting that illegal drug
transactions in a home lessen the expectation of privacy). In addition, as Professor
Middleton has pointed out, the fact that the reporters were acting with the police should
have strengthened the legality of their surreptitious electronic monitoring of their
conversation with Dietemann. See Kent R. Middleton, Journalists and Tape Recorders:
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The magazine publisher argued that publication of news insulated it from liability
for any newsgathering activities, thus inverting the notion that illegal newsgathering
affects the right to publish.346 The Ninth Circuit responded, "The First Amendment
has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes
committed during the course ofnewsgathering. 347 This passage is correct insofar as
it rejects a blanket license for the press to engage in any activity under the rubric of
newsgathering. It is incorrect because it treats the First Amendment as completely
irrelevant in the application of tort or criminal law to newsgathering activities.348 The
lack of nuance to the Ninth Circuit's approach is illustrated by its citation of an
article by Professor Nimmer in which he Casually disclaimed the presence of First
Amendment issues in intrusion cases because these cases involved "observation of the
private affairs of another and not by the publication of such observations." ' It is
true that publication is not an essential element of intrusion cases," ° but it would be
a strange doctrine not to distinguish the activities of "peeping toms" from those
involved in activities associated with dissemination of speech. 5'
Does Participant Monitoring Invade Privacy?, 2 HASTINGS COMM./ENT. L.J. 287, 312
(1979).
346 See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
141 Id. at 249. See also Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 756 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(distinguishing between claims based on the broadcast of a television news program and
claims based upon physical entry into the plaintiff's home). The court added that
constitutional protections for publication of information "do not immunize pre-publication
activities. For example, even a public figure is entitled to prevent news reporters from
entering a private home. That public figure can maintain a trespass action against a news
reporter who climbs his fence, no matter how newsworthy the ultimate story published by
the reporter." Id. at 756 n.5. But see Note, And Forgive Them Their Trespasses, supra note
19 (suggesting "necessity" defense in trespass actions involving newsgathering).
348 See, e.g., Desnick v. American Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995)
(stating that investigative broadcast journalism is entitled to First Amendment protection
"regardless of whether the tort suit is aimed at the content of the broadcast" or its
production); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986,, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[L]egitimate
countervailing social needs may warrant some intrusion despite an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy."); Hill, supra note 202, at 1285 ("[T]he First Amendment requires
that the communications media be allowed investigative methods that are somewhat
offensive, and that in a case of relative public importance they must be allowed a greater
degree of offensiveness than in others.").
"' Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 957 (1968).
350 See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 247.
351 By analogy, the common law of intrusion recognizes a difference between peeping
toms and professional investigators who are observing personal injury litigants and
insurance claimants. Litigants and claimants must expect a reasonable investigation. Courts
have found that the social interest in preventing fraudulent claims and suits places limits
on an individual's expectation of privacy. See ELDER, supra note 143, at 125-30; see also
Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998) (noting that the
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the publisher's claim that New York Times v.
Sullivan..2 and its progeny protected its actions. The court of appeals regarded that
line of cases as irrelevant because they dealt with torts where publication was an
essential element.3"' A central premise of Sullivan, however, was that First
Amendment considerations, such as the reduction of chilling effects on publicly
important speech, affect the application of tort law to public communicators." 4
Because the district court concluded that the press did not have protection for the
publication of information that was improperly acquired, it is hard to ignore the
chilling effect presented by the expansive definition of the right to be left alone.
Moreover, Sullivan and its progeny reveal that the level of protection for speech
depends upon its subject matter. One way of infusing these First Amendment
concepts into the tort of intrusion is to allow liability for compensatory damages, but
to disallow punitive damages in cases where the information sought is of public
importance.35
offensiveness of information collecting techniques depends in part on motivation); Hill,
supra note 202, at 1285 ("Our law is replete with instances in which conduct ordinarily
deemed tortious or even criminal is fully legitimated by circumstances that bring into
existence a privilege.").
352 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
... See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249-50.
114 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265.
355 See Lee, supra note 144, at 1257. One court has claimed that measuring "the degree
of the intrusion against the newsworthiness of the story is a test that is too vague and
subjective to counter-balance the predominant interest served in protecting the rights of
individuals in a free society against invasion of their privacy or their home." Anderson v.
WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d, 220, 224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981). Yet, there are very few bright
lines in privacy cases. Courts routinely assess extraordinarily subjective factors, such as the
definition of private facts in public disclosure actions. Consider, for example, the following:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account must be
taken of the customs and conventions of the community; and in the last analysis
what is proper becomes a matter of the community mores. The line is to be
drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the
public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private
lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with
decent standards, would say that he had no concern. The limitations, in other
words, are those of common decency, having due regard to the freedom of the
press and its reasonable leeway to choose what it will tell the public, but also
due regard to the feelings of the individual and the harm that will be done to
him by the exposure.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt.h, (1977) (emphasis added). Although the
Supreme Court in Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974), raised questions about ad hoc
determinations of matters of public interest, see id. at 346, the Court's defamation cases
continue to rest on a distinction between speech about private matters and public matters.
See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (common law
standards do not apply to defamation cases involving a private figure portrayed in a matter
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The Ninth Circuit acknowledged a chilling effect in a curious manner. The
publisher argued that even if there were liability for intrusion, Sullivan and its
progeny prevented harm from publication in consideration of the computation of
damages.356 The Ninth Circuit held that allowing damages for intrusion to be
enhanced by later publication "chills intrusive acts. It does not chill freedom of
expression guaranteed by the First Amendment." '357 Further, the Ninth Circuit
claimed that acceptance of the publisher's argument would "deny to the injured
plaintiff recovery for real harm done to him without any countervailing benefit to the
legitimate interest of the public in being informed."" 8 These passages rest upon two
questionable propositions. The first is that publication damages chill intrusion, which
the Ninth Circuit regarded as unprotected by the First Amendment, but do not chill
the act of publication. The Ninth Circuit was too quick to dismiss the relevance of
Sullivan and its progeny, a line of cases built upon the Court's belief that, unless
constrained by rules designed to protect freedom of expression, the threat of awards
for damages stemming from publication causes speakers to engage in self-
censorship.35 9 There is no reason to believe that editors subject to the Dietemann rule
would be inhibited only from engaging in intrusive acts, and not from publishing
information acquired from potentially intrusive activities. The second questionable
proposition is that the publication was not of legitimate interest to the public. Here
the Ninth Circuit casually dismissed the news value of the article because of the
method by which the information was obtained. Yet, an article about police
investigations of criminal activity does benefit the public, regardless of the method
used to obtain some of its contents.
This is not to say that damage from publication can never be compensated when
the publisher, or its agents, have also engaged. in intrusion.36 The privacy tort has
of public concern); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (common law defamation standards govern cases involving speech about matters of
private interest); see also Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest
Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that concern that the
judiciary will prove inadequate in defining matters of public interest is allayed by the
sizable body of cases that have employed the concept). Moreover, the Gertz Court's
definition of a public figure does not lead to predictable results. See, e.g., Rosanova v.
Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440,443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aft'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978)
("Defining public figures is like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.").
356 See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 250.
57 id.
358 Id.
319 See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277 ("The fear of damage awards ... may be markedly
more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.").
3' For additional views, see Hill, supra note 202, at 1281-85 (discussing instances in
which damages awarded for intrusion should not include any component for the harm
caused by publication, and instances when damages could include the harm from intrusion
and publication); James E. King & Frederick T. Muto, Compensatory Damages for
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developed, however, distinct tests for defining intrusion and public disclosure. Such
tests should be considered independently. Otherwise, as Dietemann reveals,judicial
or jury antipathy to information-gathering methods may color the analysis of the
publication issues.
One final aspect of Dietemann warrants discussion. An important theme in the
case is that journalists do not have special legal status by virtue of their role in
gathering and disseminating news.36' This theme is analytically misleading and only
partly right. A more appropriate statement is that while the press may have no
constitutional status distinct from other communicators, some laws can imperm issibly
burden all communicators.362 This construction presents a stronger First Amendment
Newsgatherer Torts: Toward a Workable Standard, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919, 948-53
(1981) (proposing a damages standard that falls between the extremes of Dietemann and
Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (finding that damage
awards from trespass should not include harm from publication)).
361 See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
362 Whether the press has special status also diverted the Court's attention in Cohen v.
Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991), where the Court ruled that the First Amendment did
not bar application of a promissory estoppel action against a newspaper that published the
name of a source who had been promised confidentiality by a reporter. See id at 670. In
Cohen, Justice White's majority opinion emphasized that the "'publisher of a newspaper
has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege
to invade the rights and liberties of others."' Id (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301
U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)). Consequently, enforcement of general laws like promissory
estoppel "is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against
other persons or organizations." Id. Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Marshall and Souter, felt that the subject matter of the speech, rather than the
identity of the speaker, was critical. See id. at 673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In addition,
he felt that the First Amendment protection available to the press would be equally available
to non-media defendants. See id. Finally, he stated that the majority's admonition that the
press has no special status was misplaced. See id. at 673-74.
The impact of a generally applicable law on freedom of expression can be addressed
without the overtones and shadings of special status for the press, as Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), illustrates. In Hustler, the Court found that the significance
of free debate on public figures outweighed the state's interest in punishing publications
intended to cause emotional distress. See id. at 53. Hustler also illustrated that some
generally applicable laws are capable of seriously burdening expressive activities. In
contrast, the Court in Cohen found the application of promissory estoppel to a promise
between a reporter and a source to be the "constitutionally insignificant consequence of
applying to the press a generally applicable law." Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672. Justice White
regarded this case as not involving a sanction for publication of truthful information, but
merely involving a sanction for breaking a promise. See id at 670-71. Yet, as Justice
Blackmun observed, "publication of important political speech is the claimed violation."
Id. at 675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The types of inquiries necessary under promissory
estoppel, such as whether a promise should be enforced to avoid an injustice, are not neutral
to the First Amendment because they require comparing the interest in publication against
the interest in confidentiality. Thus, despite promissory estoppel's general applicability, the
[Vol. 8:1
THE UNUSUAL SUSPECTS
claim and requires a more thoughtful analysis than that provided by the Ninth Circuit.
2. Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc.
On Scene: Emergency Response is a television program depicting dramatic
emergency rescues.3 63 On September 29, 1990, the program featured a segment
showing an emergency-rescue helicopter crew's response to an automobile accident
in which two occupants of an overturned car had to be cut free from the car with the
tool known as "thejaws of life." 3" Among audience members for this broadcast was
Ruth Shulman, who was hospitalized as a result of injuries she sustained in an
automobile crash several months earlier.3 6 Ruth was shocked to learn that the
program was showing her rescue and transport to the hospital in the helicopter.366
The flight nurse wore a wireless microphone and her conversations with Ruth at the
accident scene and during the helicopter ride were recorded and broadcast without
Ruth's knowledge or consent. 67
Ruth and her son368 brought suit against the program's producers, claiming the
videotaping of the rescue was an intrusion and the broadcast was public disclosure
of private facts. 369 The trial court granted the defendant's summary judgment
motion,37 ' but the court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that triable
issues existed on both the intrusion and public disclosure claims.37" ' The California
Supreme Court agreed that triable issues existed concerning the nonconsensual
recording of Ruth's conversations with the nurse and the nonconsensual presence of
the camera operator in the helicopter when transporting Ruth and her son to the
hospital.37 However, the state supreme court found the broadcast to be newsworthy
and sustained the trial court's judgment for the defendant on the public disclosure
claim.373
Court should have recognized the tort's serious impact on communicators.
363 See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 475 (Cal. 1998).
364 See id
365 See id.
'66 See id. at 476.
367 See id,
368 Wayne Shulman was also trapped in the overturned car. The broadcast showed only
a glimpse of Wayne and his features were not identifiable nor was his voice heard. The state
supreme court regarded this portrayal as inoffensive. See id. at 475. However, Wayne did
have an expectation of privacy when placed inside the helicopter and was permitted to
proceed with his intrusion claim. See id. at 477.
369 See id. at 476-77.
370 See id, at 477.
"' See Shulman v. Group W Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
372 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 477.
... See id.
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The California Supreme Court's analysis of the public disclosure claim was not
influenced by the possible intrusion committed during the newsgathering process.
Instead, the court analyzed the public disclosure claim solely on newsworthiness
grounds, concluding that the subject matter was of legitimate concern to the public
and disclosure of Ruth's injured physical condition and medical treatment was
substantially relevant to the subject matter. 74 The only instance when newsgathering
and publication were intertwined was in a footnote on damages. After noting that the
Supreme Court in Florida Star left open the possibility that cases involving
publication of unlawfully acquired information could involve sanctions not only for
the newsgathering but also for the ensuing publication, the state supreme court stated,
"We do not decide that question in the present case, regarding it as going to the extent
of allowable damages for intrusion." 3" Although the California court did not have
a damage award before it, and in some cases both intrusion and public disclosure
could be present, it is odd that a constitutionally protected publication can affect
damages for intrusion. Stated differently, public disclosure cases involve content-
based interests while intrusion cases involve content-neutral interests. Claims for
each type of case require separate analysis and damage awards for intrusion should
be enhanced by publication only when the material published is not newsworthy.
Despite its rather off-hand remark about damages, the California Supreme Court
acknowledged that sensitive content-based questions were presented in public
disclosure cases while intrusion cases involved content-neutral questions about the
impact of generally applicable laws. The state court was hesitant to sit as "superior
editors" to define which details were not important to a story.376 Such authority
would "assert impermissible supervisory power over the press." '377 Yet, the court's
reluctance to second-guessjournalistic decisions about which facts were essential to
the narrative 7 8 did not extend to questions such as how or where to gather
information. The court averred, "A reasonable jury could conclude the producers'
desire to get footage that would convey the 'feel' of the event-the real sights and
sounds of a difficult rescue--did not justify either placing a microphone on Nurse
"7 See id. at 479.
... Id. at 489 n. 11; see also Special Force Ministriesv. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d
789, 793 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that a plaintiff alleging fraud and trespass
should be allowed to present evidence and arguments on publication damages).
376 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488. The court asked, "How can the courts fashion and
administer meaningful rules for protecting privacy without unconstitutionally setting
themselves up as censors or editors?" Id. at 474.
17 Id. at 495.
17' For example, in response to the plaintiffs' claim that the images and sounds that
identified Ruth as the accident victim were irrelevant, the court stated, "It is difficult to see
how the subject broadcast could have been edited to avoid completely any possible




Carnahan or filming inside the rescue helicopter."379 This lack of deference may be
explained by the court's belief that the intrusion tort did not "subject the press to
liability forthe contents of its publications."'BO In otherwords, the interest in privacy
is at its zenith in intrusion cases38' and the press has no special exemption from
generally applicable content-neutral laws.382
However, the court did not intend to hold that the First Amendment was irrelevant
in intrusion cases. The court measured the "offensiveness" of any intrusion383 by the
intruder's motivation and method of investigation. The court distinguished between
journalists gathering information about socially important matters and those who
intrude for purposes such as harassment or prurient curiosity.3" But even pursuit of
an important story did not justify the use of methods such as wiretapping. 35 Thus,
to the California Supreme Court, the method ofnewsgathering was critical; "routine"
techniques such as asking questions about confidential matters, as in Nicholson,386
would not be highly offensive, while trespass or wiretapping would be. In between
these two extremes lie cases involving hidden cameras and microphones for which
there were no bright lines.387 In Shulman, the court did not believe that the concealed
microphone was an "indispensable" reporting device.
The question remains as to what constitutes an "indispensable" reporting tool.
The court did not base its conclusion that the concealed microphone was dispensable
on an analysis of the communicative power of various tools of communication.
Instead, this conclusion was based on an analysis of the depth of the intrusion
permitted by the technology in this instance. Especially important to the court in
319 Id. at 494.
380 Id. at 496.
3' See id. at 489 (noting the "conceptual centrality" of the intrusion tort).
382 See id. at 495.
33 The court described intrusion as involving two elements: "(1) intrusion into a private
place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id.
at 490.
384 See id. at 493. Although referring specifically to journalists, an undefined class, the
court's concern for motivation should also apply to non-media personnel who seek
information for public dissemination.
385 See id. at 494.
386 See supra notes 249-64 and accompanying text.
387 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 494-95. After Shulman, the California Supreme Court in
Sanders v. American Broad Co., 1999 Cal. LEXIS 3900 (Cal. June 24, 1999), again noted
the ad hoc nature of intrusion cases involving hidden cameras and microphones. The court
stated that secret recording by journalists was not necessarily an intrusion. "Whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy is violated by such recording depends on the exact nature
of the conduct and all the surrounding circumstances. In addition, liability under the
intrusion tort requires that the invasion be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
considering, among other factors, the motive of the alleged intruder." Id. at *4.
388 See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 495.
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Shulman was the defendant's calculated exploitation of Ruth's vulnerability: "A
reasonablejury could find that defendants, in placing a microphone on an emergency
treatment nurse and recording her conversation with a distressed, disoriented and
severely injured patient, without the patient's knowledge or consent, acted with highly
offensive disrespect for the patient's personal privacy .... 389
While Shulman arguably leaves open the possibility of a damage award for
intrusion to include harm from publication, the state court's concern for the
motivation of newsgathering activities should mitigate an award of compensatory
damages and bar punitive damages. The standards for punitive damages play a major
role in the two cases discussed next.
3. Food Lion v. ABC
On November 5, 1992, PrimeTime Live reached the largest audience in its history
with a program that included a story about the food handling and sanitation practices
of the Food Lion grocery chain.3 The Food Lion segment included about six
minutes of video footage shot by two ABC employees who had worn hidden video
cameras during a brief period of time when they had also worked at Food Lion
stores.39' To gain employment at Food Lion, the two ABC employees did not disclose
that they were ABC employees and falsely represented their employment histories,
including false references, to appear as though they had relevant food handling
experience.392 Their intent was to deceive Food Lion in order to gain access to areas
of stores not open to the public.3 93 ABC's news policy requires that employees not
disguise their identity without prior approval of management.3 94 Accordingly, the
9 Id. at 494. Similarly, the court held that "entering and riding in an ambulance" with
seriously injured patients could reasonably be regarded as "an egregious intrusion on a
place of expected seclusion." Id.
3' The broadcast "described many unsanitary-and distinctly unappetizing-food
handling practices at Food Lion: workers preparing sandwiches without gloves and altering
expiration dates on deli products; old chicken tarted up with barbeque sauce; stinky fish
rinsed with bleach." Amy Singer, Food, Lies, and Videotape, AM. LAW., Apr. 1997, at 57
[hereinafter Singer, Food]. Food Lion sought to obtain an injunction against the broadcast
of the videotape, but this request was denied. Opening Brief for Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
at 5, Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 97-2492, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
26373 (4th Cir. Oct. 20, 1999) [hereinafter cited as Opening Brief for ABC].
9 See Singer, Food, supra note 390, at 57-58.
392 See id. at 58.
... For a more detailed discussion of ABC's efforts to place its employees in Food Lion
facilities, see Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 814-16
(M.D.N.C. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26373.
... See Singer, Food, supra note 390, at 58.
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Food Lion undercover investigation was approved by senior management of ABC,
including an attorney. 95
After the broadcast, Food Lion brought suit for a variety of torts, such as
intentional misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, negligent supervision, trespass, breach
of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and unfair and deceptive trade practices. 96
Although publicly disputing the truthfulness of ABC's portrayal, Food Lion did not
bring a defamation action3 97 Ruling on ABC's motion to dismiss all ofthe claims on
First Amendment grounds, the federal district court refused to dismiss the fraud,
trespass, and civil conspiracy claims, dismissed claims such as wiretapping, and
deferred ruling on claims such as unfair trade practices 9"
The district court ruled that the First Amendment did not bar recovery for
damages stemming from acts that violated generally applicable laws like fraud.399
However, the court rejected Food Lion's claim that the alleged wrongful methods of
obtaining information allowed Food Lion to recover for damage to its reputation. °°
"[A]ny publication damages for injury to its reputation" were barred unless Food
Lion established the defamation requirements of actual malice and falsity.40' To the
9 See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 815.
396 See id. at 812-13. Food Lion also claimed, unsuccessfully, that it owned the copyright
to the material obtained through the use of hidden cameras. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 420 (M.D.N.C. 1996), aff'dmem., 116 F.3d 472 (4th Cir.
1997).
39' Food Lion's lawyers did not feel they had obtained enough evidence prior to the time
limit imposed by the statute of limitations to prove a defamation claim. See Singer, supra
note 390, at 58. Later, they discovered that ABC had deleted material from the copy of the
raw videotape footage provided to Food Lion. They sought to amend their complaint to add
a claim of defamation, butthe magistrate judge denied this request, stating:
In open court during oral argument, the court saw and heard the video and
audio out takes described by Food Lion in its brief as possible bases for
bringing a libel claim. There simply is no relation whatsoever between the out
takes and any possible libel action Food Lion may have contemplated over two
years ago.
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 165 F.R.D. 454, 457 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
398 See FoodLion, 887 F. Supp. at 824.
'9 See id. at 823.
400 See id.
411 Id. The district court was guided by Cohen and Hustler. In Cohen, damages for
promissory estoppel were allowed because the cause of action was not being used to avoid
the strict requirements for establishing a defamation claim. See Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991). But see infra note 517. In contrast, the Court, in Hustler
ruled that public figures seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress
from satirical publications must establish actual malice. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). The district court stated:
Where a plaintiff sought recovery for non-reputational or non-state of mind
injuries, the Cohen Court indicated that such a plaintiff could recover these
damages without offending the First Amendment. Where, however, a plaintiff
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district court, First Amendment standards governed the type of damages Food Lion
could recover, but the First Amendment did not affect the application of generally
applicable torts that were not tied to the communicative impact of the broadcast.4"2
The case was presented to the jury in three phases; in none did the jury see the
PrimeTime Live story on Food Lion.4" 3 Thejury first considered ABC's liability for
fraud, trespass, and breach ofthe duty of loyalty.4 4 Thejudge's instructions on these
torts included the following:
You should not concern yourself in any way with what ABC broadcast or
did not broadcast about Food Lion. You have not heard any evidence
about the content of the broadcast. This is intentional. It is immaterial
what was or was not broadcast by ABC. The claims of fraud, trespass
and breach of duty do not have anything to do with the content of the
broadcast.0S
The jury found the defendants liable on all counts.4"6 Prior to beginning the
compensatory damages phase, the judge ruled that proof of damages stemming from
the broadcast, such as "' lost profits, lost sales, diminished stock value or anything of
that nature' would not be permitted.".' 7 The jury awarded $1400 in compensatory
seeks to use a generally applicable law to recover for injury to reputation or
state of mind while avoiding the requirements of a defamation claim (requiring
proof of falsity and actual malice), the Cohen holding does not appear to be
applicable. To the extent that Food Lion is attempting to recover reputational
damages without establishing the requirements of a defamation claim, this case
more closely resembles Hustler.
Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 823; see also Veilleux v. NBC, 8 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Me. 1998)
(refusing to dismiss plaintiff's claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress based on
promises made to induce cooperation in the production of a television news magazine story
because the claim was not an effort to avoid the requirements of a defamation claim).
402 See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 823.
403 See Transcript of Proceedings at 1804, Food Lion (No. 6:92CV00592).
4 See id. at 1791.
401 Id. at 1804.
406 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 958 (M.D.N.C.
1997).
407 FoodLion, 964 F. Supp. at 958 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (quoting Transcript of Proceedings
at 1848, Food Lion (No. 6:92CV00592)). The court found that these types of damages were
not proximately caused by the fraud, trespass, and breach of duty. See id. at 959. On the
fraud and trespass claims, the court found that while the tortious activities of ABC's
employees enabled access to store areas in which the public was not allowed, "it was the
food handling practices themselves-not the method by which they were recorded or
published-which caused the loss of consumer confidence." Id. at 963. On the duty of
loyalty claim, the court ruled that if the ABC employees had staged scenes which were later
broadcast, the "breach of their duty could be the proximate cause of 'publication damages."'
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damages on thefraud claim, and nominal damages of $1 each on the trespass and
breach of duty claims.4°8
In the punitive damages phase, the jury was urged by Food Lion to become "the
policeman on the media highway . *..". ."" ABC countered that deception is
sometimesjustified in newsgathering and that the network had a higher moral purpose
for telling the lies.4 ' The judge again instructed the jury that the content of the
broadcast was not at issue.41' He also instructed the jury that the use of hidden
cameras by a participant was legal, and did not by itself constitute conduct that would
justify an award of punitive damages. 2 Thejury awarded a total of $5,545,750 in
punitive damages on the fraud claim, which thejudge considered to be excessive and
reduced to $315,000. 4m1 In post-trial interviews, jurors revealed that they had
considered punitive damages ranging from $1 to $1 billion.4 4 The focus of the
debate was when, if ever, lying is justified. The juror who advocated the $1 billion
award felt that it was never justified.41 5 At the other extreme, another juror was
willing to forgive ABC "for trying to bring a good story. '4 6 As a compromise, the
jurors agreed upon $5.5 million, with one juror persuading the others that the two
employees who went undercover should not be liable for any punitive damages. 417
Id. During the liability phase of the trial, Food Lion presented evidence about the staging
of various incidents. Several of these incidents were not presented on the broadcast and
therefore were incapable of causing publication damages. See id. at 964. In the other
incidents, the ABC employees did not create situations which would not otherwise have
existed. See id. at 964-65.
408 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 6:92CV00592, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11344, at *17 (M.D.N.C. July 9, 1997). The jury also recommended an award of
$1,500 on the unfair trade practices claim. The district court ruled that Food Lion had to
choose between recovery on its common law claims or its statutory unfair trade practices
claim. See id. Food Lion elected the damages on its common law claims. See Food Lion,
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 6:92CV00592, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13391, at *7
(M.D.N.C. July 25, 1997).
4o Singer, Food, supra note 390, at 63.
410 See id.; see also Robert Lissit, Gotcha, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 1995,. at 17
(discussing circumstances when some journalists believe deception is justified).
411 See Transcript of Proceedings at 3237, Food Lion (No. 6:92CV00592). The judge's
instructions stated, "For purposes of your deliberations, the broadcast must be assumed to
be true and you may not consider any effect the broadcast may have had upon the viewing
public or upon Food Lion's sales or profits in considering punitive damages." Id.
412 See id. at 3236-37.
413 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 937-40 (M.D.N.C.
1997).
414 See Singer, Food, supra note 390, at 64.
411 See Barry Meier, Jury Says ABC Owes Damages of $5.5 Million, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
23, 1997, at A1, B1.
416 Singer, Food, supra note 390, at 64.
417 See id.
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The jurors believed they were sending ABC a message that,it needed to gather
information in a "'different way.'''41
8
Three distinct First Amendment issues were presented in this case. The first issue
was whether the First Amendment was irrelevant for purposes of establishing
liability. 19 The second issue was whether ABC's information-gathering methods
entitled Food Lion to recover publication damages without meeting the constitutional
requirements for a defamation claim. 4"0 The third was the question of whether there
were any First Amendment barriers to an award of punitive damages, even if the First
Amendment were irrelevant for purposes of liability.
421
On the first issue, the district court quoted Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,422 for the
proposition that "'generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment
simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability
to gather and report the news.""'4 3 Cohen is notable for the Court's belief that
application of promissory estoppel to the press did not trigger any First Amendment
analysis. 424 The Food Lion district court similarly was satisfied with the general
applicability of torts such as fraud, simply noting that applying these torts to ABC
did not violate the First Amendment.425
The identification of a law as generally applicable usually triggers either no First
Amendment scrutiny or relaxed scrutiny, such as in the test articulated in United
States v. O'Brien.42 6 Only on rare occasions does the Court find such a law invalid
as applied to expressive activities.42 '7 Those rare occasions, though, mean that the
generally applicable label should be read with caution; it does not always signal an
absence of serious constitutional questions.428 One type of generally applicable law
is that which does not reach acts covered by the First Amendment. Examples include
antitrust or labor laws that are aimed at the business practices of a range of
418 Meier, supra note 415, at B 11 (quoting juror Tony Kuton).
419 FoodLion, 984 F. Supp. at 929. See also FoodLion, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11344,
at * 14) (ruling that state unfair trade practices law does not implicate the First
Amendment).
420 See Food Lion, 984 F. Supp. at 932.
42 See id at 931-32.
422 501 U.S. 663 (1991); see also supra note 362 & infra note 434.
423 FoodLion, 984 F. Supp. at 929 (quoting Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669).
424 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
425 See Food Lion, 984 F. Supp. at 929.
426 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien held that because of the substantial interest in
protecting the selective service process, and the narrow means available to protect the
process, the conviction of O'Brien was merited. See id at 382.
427 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (recognizing that the
abridgment of First Amendment rights, "even though unintended, may inevitably follow
from varied forms of governmental action.").
428 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,901(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
('[Tlhere is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability .... ).
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enterprises." 9 A distinct type of generally applicable law, includes within its scope
both acts covered and not covered by the First Amendment. Examples of such
include noise ordinances and public indecency laws that reach actions intended to
convey messages as well as actions not intended to convey messages.43 ° When
applied to expressive activities, or activities "commonly associated with
expression,"43 these laws are subjected to a weighing of the state's interest against
the burden on expression.
The district court in Food Lion treated torts such as fraud as not reaching acts
covered by the First Amendment, yet ABC's activities were designed to gather news
on a matter of public importance. The district court was satisfied that the torts did
not "'target or single out the press,""'43 while acknowledging that the press does not
have special rights.433 However, the concern for the press having special exemptions
from laws of general applicability is, as previously noted, only partly correct. Instead
of rejecting the First Amendment out of hand, the district court should have been
concerned with the application of these torts-to communicators. Just as it is
erroneous to regard newsgathering as a carte blanche license to engage in any
behavior, it is also fallacious to discount completely the constitutional values served
by newsgathering. For the purposes of determining liability, the district court should
have engaged in content-neutral analysis.434 Under this analysis, the significance of
the state's interests and the question of whether enforcement of the law is properly
tailored to serve those interests are examined. For purposes of liability, application
of torts such as fraud to ABC's conduct narrowly serves substantial content-neutral
interests. However, the burden on expressive activities varies according to the type
and amount of damages that are allowed. The district court acknowledged the First
Amendment implications of these issues, which are addressed next.
429 See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (finding that application
of the National Labor Relations Act to businesses involved in the dissemination of news did
not interfere with freedom to publish news).
430 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570-71 (1991) (noting that a
public indecency law is aimed at public nudity whether or not it is combined with
expressive activity).
431 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988) (describing
placement of newsboxes on public property as conduct associated with expression).
432 Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 822 (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663,
670 (1991)).
433 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 6:92CV00592, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13214 at *11 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
134 Content-neutral analysis is triggered by the fact that the torts at issue in Food Lion
are not tied to communicative impact and the harm from ABC's newsgathering exists
regardless of whether or not ABC broadcast the surreptitiously obtained videotapes. This
analysis is distinct from Cohen where the Court did not acknowledge that promissory
estoppel was triggered by publication of Cohen's name. See supra note 362. Moreover,
analysis of promissory estoppel involves questions which are not content neutral.
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Despite the court's belief that the First Amendment was irrelevant to liability
issues, it issued two key rulings that limited the type ofdamage Food Lion could seek
as having resulted from ABC's newsgathering methods. The first was the court's
ruling that Food Lion could not recover damage to its reputation without proving
falsity and actual malice.433 In effect, Food Lion claimed that illegal information-
gathering methods were sufficient to make the publication of that information, even
iftrue, fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. The district court rejected
this, drawing largely upon Hustler,4 36 in which the Court ruled that constitutional
libel standards applied to intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.437
Although the court in FoodLion did not expand upon this ruling, one can easily see
the havoc to defamation law that would result from allowing recovery without
meeting constitutional standards.
Some information-gathering methods, such as the deliberate distortion of an
event,4 38 would be helpful in establishing the presence of knowledge of falsity in a
defamation case, but it is untenable to believe that trespass, for example, would
override the constitutional protections surrounding the act of publication. To allow
punishment for trespass or similar newsgathering acts to engulf constitutional
standards for publication would not be a narrowly tailored method of protecting the
interests served by trespass law. The concern for First Amendment tailoring
mandates that an act such as trespass be punished as just that-trespass-without
outrunning the interest served by the underlying tort. Stated differently, trespass
serves content-neutral interests, and to allow a trespass claim to include damage for
the communicative impact of a subsequent publication distorts those interests.
The district court also prevented Food Lion from seeking recovery for "'lost
sales, lost profits, or diminished stock value.'' ' 39 The district court's ruling was
based on a proximate cause analysis rather than a First Amendment analysis.440
Nonetheless, as with damages relating to reputation, damages such as lost profits are
tied to communicative impact. Allowing ajury to entertain the prospect of awarding
4 See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 823-24.
436 See id at 823.
431 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
43' Food Lion sought to prove that the ABC employees staged certain events during their
Food Lion employment. See FoodLion, 964 F. Supp. at 963-66. The impact of staged video
presentations in defamation actions is illustrated by NBC's settlement of a defamation suit
brought by General Motors in which GM discovered that NBC had rigged a fiery pickup
truck crash for a Dateline NBC broadcast. See How GMOne-UppedAn Embarrassed NBC
On StagedNews Event, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1I, 1993, at Al. Once GM acquired evidence of
the staging, NBC agreed to issue an on-air apology and to reimburse GM for the money it
spent investigating the Dateline report. See id.
419 Food Lion, 964 F. Supp. at 958 (quoting Transcript of Proceedings at 1848, Food
Lion (No. 6:92CV00592)).
440 See supra note 40 1.
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damages for lost profits and the like, which Food Lion believed were in the
"neighborhood" of $5.5 billion,44" ' without proof of falsity and actual malice, would
enable juries to use compensatory damages as a guise for their dislike of the
information-gathering methods or the truth of the publication. The jury was
instructed that Food Lion was only entitled to recover costs from the fraud, such as
the expense of hiring and training the employees, placing them on the payroll, and
terminating them from the payroll." 2
The district court did believe First Amendment standards were relevant for
punitive damages. Thejury was instructed in the liability portion of the trial that one
of the elements of fraud is intent to deceive.443 In the punitive damages phase, the
court instructed the jury that any findings of fraud already made may support the
necessary "consciousness of wrongdoing" standard for punitive damages.444 Ruling
on ABC's post-trial claim that the First Amendment precluded the award of punitive
damages, the district court drew upon defamation cases which required that in
situations involving matters of public concern, punitive damages are available only
where actual malice is shown.445 The district court wrote:
For thejury to award punitive damages in this case, it was required to find
that Defendants acted with a consciousness of wrongdoing. Therefore, the
jury was required to find a form of intent in the actions taken by
Defendants in order for them to award punitive damages. The relationship
of consciousness of wrongdoing to the torts in this case is, in the view of
this Court, the same type of relationship that actual malice has to the tort
of libel. The higher threshold that must be reached before punitive
damages are awarded satisfies the dictates of Gertz and provides
protection for a member of the press who acts negligently or without
intent to violate generally applicable laws.446
4' See Food Lion, 964 F. Supp. at 965.
442 See Transcript of Proceedings at 1921, Food Lion (No. 6:92CV00592). Food Lion
did not contend that it suffered actual damages from the trespass. See id. Similarly, it
sought only nominal damages for the breach of the duty of loyalty claim. See id. at 1922.
441 See id. at 1794.
See id. at 3233. The only difference between the relevant state laws was that South
Carolina requires proof by clear and convincing evidence while the standard in North
Carolina is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 3232-34.
"' See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761
(1985) (acknowledging that in cases involving private matters, punitive damages are
available without proof of actual malice); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350
(1974) (noting that cases involving speech about public matters require proof of actual
malice before punitive damages are awarded).
446 Food Lion, 984 F. Supp. at 932.
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There are two significant aspects to this passage: first, a beliefthat a higher threshold
must be met in cases such as this; and second, the claim that the consciousness of
wrongdoing standard is a higher threshold. The district court was correct on the first
point but wrong on the second.
If the district court believed that a higher threshold was triggered by defendants'
status as members of the press, it was denigrating the First Amendment protections
that should be available to nonmedia defendants. However, because the court relied
upon Gertz v. Welch,44 another possible reading of the opinion is that the higher
threshold is tied to the subject matter, rather than the identity of the speaker." 8 This
reading is important for three reasons. First, if this reading is applied, the protection
to which ABC is entitled would also be available to a nonpress entity, such as a
public interest group concerned about food safety, which documented and publicized
conditions at Food Lion stores. Second, the subject matter distinction would be
useful in analyzing the degree of reprehensibility, a critical component of punitive
damages analysis. Third, since the district court believed that the interest in gathering
news had to be balanced against the interest in punishing unlawful conduct,449 a
distinction between conduct aimed at gathering private information and information
of public concern creates an appropriate balance.
The consciousness of wrongdoing standard does not meet constitutional
standards. To understand this concept, it is necessary to explain the Gertz ruling and
the constitutional developments that preceded it. With Sullivan, the Court began a
radical transformation of defamation law to provide "breathing space" for freedom
of expression.4"' One of the Court's concerns was to infuse the First Amendment
requirement of tailoring into the standards for damage awards, especially punitive
damages.45' In Gertz, the Court distinguished between private figures and public
figures in damage awards for harm to reputation." 2 This distinction between
plaintiffs wasjustified by the Court's belief that private plaintiffs "are not only more
vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more
deserving of recovery." 4"3 However, punitive damages have been "wholly irrelevant"
to the interest in compensating private plaintiffs for harm to reputation; the Court has
required all plaintiffs in cases involving public matters to prove at least actual malice
7 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
448 See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 773, n. 4 (White, J., concurring) (stating that none
of the Court's cases support the proposition that the press has greater rights than other
communicators).
4 See Food Lion, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13214, at * 18.
410 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 & 298 (1964).
411 See id at 284 (noting that where the jury was not instructed to differentiate between
general and punitive damages, its award is unconstitutional); See also Gertz, 418 U.S. at
349 (state remedies for defamation must reach "no farther than is necessary").
452 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-52.
153 Id at 345.
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before receiving punitive damages.454 The actual malice standard was necessary to
guard against juries selectively punishing unpopular views and awarding amounts
which bear no relation to the harm.4"
Gertz is not a definitive treatment of punitive damages and the First
Amendment.45 6 Yet, at a minimum, it means that the First Amendment establishes a
barrier to punitive damages that is overcome only in extreme circumstances. 4" The
central problem with the court'sjury instructions in FoodLion was that the definition
of liability'seemed to automatically entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages. It also
bears repeating that the jury instructions on liability were based on the proposition
that the First Amendment was completely irrelevant to torts such as fraud. Moreover,
the district court's apparent belief that ABC's intent to violate the law was sufficient
to cross the constitutional threshold overlooks the fact that the Court has found in
other First Amendment contexts that "many things done with motives that are less
than admirable are protected by the First Amendment." '458
Although the district court reduced the amount of punitive damages on due
process grounds, Gertz indicated that there is a First Amendment concern for a
reasonable relationship between compensatory damages and punitive damages. Given
4 See id. at 350; see also Dun& Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749, 757 n.4 (1985) (explaining
the public speech/private speech dichotomy of Gertz). One of the primary themes of Gertz
was federalism; states were allowed to determine the standard of liability for private figures
as long as they did not impose strict liability. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. Gertz does not
require states to allow punitive damages. See, e.g., Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.,
330 N.E.2d 161, 169 (Mass. 1975) (holding that damages for libel are compensatory and
subject to special scrutiny). Nor does it prevent states from requiring that both actual malice
and common law malice be found before punitive damages are awarded. See, e.g., DiSalle
v. P.G. Publ'g Co., 544 A.2d 1345 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the jury was properly
instructed to find both actual and common law malice). For commentary advocating that
common law malice and actual malice be proven before punitive damages are awarded, see
Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 847, 848-62 (1985).
411 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
456 See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that punitive damages could violate the First Amendment); Florida Star
v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 n.9 (1989) (stating that because liability could not be imposed
on a newspaper publisher for publication of truthful information obtained from police
records, the Court had no occasion to address the claim that imposition of punitive damages
independently violated the First Amendment).
... See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 50 (1983) ("Our concern in Gertz was that the threat
of punitive damages, ifnot limitedto especially egregious cases," would chill the "'exercise
of First Amendment freedoms'... ." (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349) (emphasis added)).
4"8 Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,53 (1988). In the defamation context,
trial courts have frequently confused the concepts of ill-will malice and actual malice. See,
e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 754-55 (discussing problems with trial court's
instructions concerning malice); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
280-82 (1974) (same).
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the modest award of $1400 compensatory damages, and the fact that ABC was
pursuing a story of public concern, even the reduced punitive damage award of
$315,000 seems disproportionate. Although the traditional underpinnings of punitive
damages--deterrence of similar behavior and making an example of the
wrongdoer-may call for a larger award, the need for narrow tailoring under the First
Amendment tugs in the opposite direction. Furthermore, the threat of punitive
damages is not the only factor deterring widespread lawbreaking by the press; news
organizations depend upon public trust. The extensive criticism of ABC's
investigatory methods following the Food Lion case surely heightened awareness
among journalists of the need to act within legal limits.4" 9
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment on the fraud
and unfair trade practices claims,4 " affirmed the judgment on the breach of duty and
trespass claims,46" ' and affirmed the district court's refusal to allow Food Lion to
recover publication damages without meeting constitutional standards.462 Since Food
Lion's punitive damage award was based on its fraud claim, the court of appeals
eliminated the award without discussing the First Amendment standards for punitive
damages. 463 The First Amendment was discussed only in terms of the level of
scrutiny necessary when generally applicable torts are enforced against the press and
the issue of publication damages.464
Drawing upon Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,465 the court of appeals did not
411 See, e.g., Dorothy Rabinowitz, ABC's Food Lion Mission, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11,
1997, at A20.
4-o See Food Lion, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26373, at *17 & *34 (4th Cir. Oct. 20, 1999).
The court of appeals found that the two ABC employees were hired by Food Lion as "at-
will" employees. Thus, Food Lion's damage claim for administrative costs attributable to
these employees was inconsistent with the "at-will" employment doctrine. See id. at * 12-15.
Nor was Food Lion's fraud claim supported by proof that the two employees did not
perform their jobs satisfactorily. See id. at * 16-17. The unfair trade practices verdict was
set aside because the misrepresentations did not harm the public and ABC was not
competing with Food Lion. See id. at *34-36.
461 On the breach of duty claim, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the ABC employees
"did not serve Food Lion faithfully, and their interest (which was the same as ABC's) was
diametrically opposed to Food Lion's." Id. at *23. Similarly, the court of appeals affirmed
the trespass verdict because the ABC employees videotaped in nonpublic areas and this
"wrongful act" exceeded their authority to enter Food Lion's premises as employees. See
id. at *3 1.
462 See id. at *43-49; see also infra text accompanying notes 468-70.
463 See id. at *42.
464 See id. at *37.40.
465 501 U.S. 663 (1991). See supra note 362. ABC argued that Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), demonstrated that content-neutral laws of general applicability
may be subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. The court of appeals,
however, distinguished Barnes from COhen, because the former involved nude dancing, a
form of expression, while the latter involved a breach of promise "and not some form of
[Vol. 8:1
THE UNUSUAL SUSPECTS
believe the torts of breach of duty and trespass triggered First Amendment scrutiny
because neither tort targeted the press nor had more than an incidental effect on
newsgathering. 66 As previously shown, the general applicability of a law does not
define its constitutionality in all applications. The court of appeals' belief that these
torts have a minimal impact on the press is perhaps influenced by the nominal damage
awards. Alternatively, the court of appeals implied ABC's methods were dispensable
when it stated, "We are convinced that the media can do its important job without
resort to the commission of run-of-the-mill torts. 4 67
On the issue of publication damages, Food Lion again argued that because ABC
obtained the videotapes through unlawful acts, Food Lion was entitled to
compensation for lost sales and loss of good will without meeting the actual malice
standard. The court of appeals, however, believed "damages resulting from
speech 461 were distinct from damages stemming from acts such as trespass. Food
Lion was trying to make an "end-run around First Amendment strictures" by
recovering "defamation-type damages under non-reputational tort claims" and this
was foreclosed by Hustler.'69 The court of appeals noted that if state law standards
had applied in Hustler, the underlying conduct would have been unlawful.
"Notwithstanding the nature of the underlying act, the Court held [in Hustler] that
satisfying New York Times was a prerequisite to the recovery of publication
damages."47
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Food Lion rested upon the premise that illegal
newsgathering activities do not reduce the First Amendment's protection for the
publication of illegally-acquired information. While this Article disagrees with the
Fourth Circuit's belief that torts such as trespass do not trigger First Amendment
scrutiny when applied to the press, the appellate court's analysis of damages will
likely help other courts separate content-neutral damage claims based on
newsgathering activities from content-based publication damage claims.
4. W.D.I.A. Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Jeffrey Rothfeder, a Business Week editor, wondered how difficult it was to
access someone else's credit report. With the approval of McGraw-Hill executives
and attorneys, Rothfeder devised a plan to test the security of the credit-reporting
expression." Food Lion, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26373, at *42. This view of Cohen does
not acknowledge that the damages stemmed from publication of Cohen's name. See infra
note 517. More importantly, though, the court of appeals completely discounted the First
Amendment values served by ABC's methods.
41 See Food Lion, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26373, at *40.
467 Id.
468 Id. at *46.
469 Id. at *44.
470 Id. at *48-49.
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industry; Rothefeder would lie to credit-reporting agencies, claiming that McGraw-
Hill needed credit reports to screen prospective employees,47" ' a permissible purpose
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.472 Rothfeder decided not to test the Big Three
credit bureaus-TRW, Equifax, and Trans Union; instead, he targeted on-line
"superbureaus" which provide businesses with computerized access to the files of the
Big Three.473 After speaking with sales representatives of nearly a dozen
"superbureaus," Rothfeder signed up with two firms, identifying himself as an editor
at McGraw-Hill.474 Following a perfunctory check, both firms gave him access to
credit files and a broad range of information such as Social Security numbers, driving
records, and credit-card numbers.4" Through one "superbureau," W.D.I.A.,
Rothfeder obtained information about Vice-President Dan Quayle-Quayle charged
more at Sears than at Brooks Brothers.476
In the cover story for its September 4, 1989 issue, Business Week reported
Rothfeder's test, including disclosure ofRothfeder's misrepresentation of his purpose
to obtain the reports.477 In a "highly unusual" move, Business Week did not identify
W.D.I.A., nor even specify the area of the country in which it was located.47 As
Rothfeder later testified, the purpose of the test "'was not to point to any particular
company that provided the information. The test was of the system. The system
turned out to be insecure. That's what we wrote about in the story.'
479
Rothfeder's test was unusual for a journalist, but "mystery shopping," which
tests whether credit-reporting firms comply with legal requirements, is common in the
credit-reporting industry.48° Six months before Rothfeder's test, the Associated
Credit Bureaus (ACB) conducted a test of W.D.I.A.4 ' An ACB staff member
fabricated a business, falsified a permissible purpose for obtaining credit reports, and
became a W.D.I.A. subscriber.4 2 W.D.I.A.'s failure to prevent a dubious user from
obtaining confidential information was reported by ACB to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and also to Trans Union, one of W.D.I.A.'s information
471 See W.D.I.A. Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 612,616 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
472 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1996).
471 See W.D.LA., 34 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
4' The application submitted to W.D.I.A. had false, inconsistent, and incomplete
information. See Jeffrey Rothfeder, Is Nothing Private, BUS. WK., Sept. 4, 1989, at 82.
471 See W.I.D.A., 34 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
476 See Rothfeder, supra note 474, at 74. The magazine obtained Quayle's consent to
publish this information. Thus, publication of the information did not constitute improper
use in violation of McGraw-Hill's contract with W.D.I.A. See W.D.I.A., 34.F. Supp. 2d at
617.
477 See Rothfeder, supra note 474, at 82.
471 See W.D.I.A., 34 F. Supp. 2d at 622.
471 Id. at 622 (quoting Jeffrey Rothfeder's testimony).





suppliers.483 Trans Union cut off W.D.I.A.'s access to Trans Union files for a period
of eight weeks.4 u W.D.I.A. did not believe ACB's secret compliance audit was
fraudulent or a breach of contract and actually commended ACB for its actions.485
W.D.I.A.'s reaction to the Business Week article, however, was quite different.
Despite the fact that the firm was not identified in the article, W.D.I.A. executives
believed the company's identity was clear to its suppliers and customers.416 Mark
Hanna, W.D.I.A.'s president, flew to Trans Union's Chicago headquarters to avert
being cut off again from Trans Union's information.48 7 At this meeting, Trans Union
executives learned W.D.I.A. was the "superbureau" which had allowed Rothfeder to
access Trans Union's file containing information about Vice-President Quayle. g
Several days after the Business Week article was published, the FTC notified
W.D.I.A. that it was launching an investigation into the firm's procedures. 9
W.D.I.A. believed the Business Week article triggered the FTC investigation.9
Rather than commending Rothfeder's test as it had that of the ACB, the firm brought
suit against McGraw-Hill and Rothfeder for fraud and breach of contract.49 '
W.D.I.A. sought $489,241 in compensatory damages to recover costs stemming from
the FTC investigation and travel expenses related to damage-control efforts such as
the meeting with Trans Union.9 It also sought $45,000,000 in punitive damages. 3
Herman J. Weber of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio found McGraw-Hill and Rothfeder guilty of breach of contract and fraud. 4
He wrote, "For the first time in its illustrious history, McGraw-Hill deliberately and
intentionally made misrepresentations and promises to an entity in writing which it
had no intention of keeping at the very time the written promises were made. 495
Rothfeder did the same, Judge Weber added.496 The defendants' First Amendment
arguments were given cursory treatment by the district court which merely noted that
483 See id.
484 See id.
411 See id at 618-19.
486 See id. at 618.
487 See id.
411 Prior to this meeting, Trans Union executives who had read the Business Week article
were unaware that W.D.I.A. was connected to the events depicted in the article. See id. at
619.
489 See id. at 619. Although dated September 4, 1989, the Court noted that "[t]he issue
of Business Week containing the article became available on or about August 29, 1989." Id.
490 See id.
491 See id. at 620.
492 See id. at 616.
491 See id.
494 See id. at 628.
491 Id. at 619-20. The defendants were aware they were violating the Fair Credit
Reporting Act and their contract with W.D.I.A. See id. at 623-24.
496 See id. at 620.
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generally applicable laws incidentally affecting newsgathering do not violate the First
Amendment.497 Although the district court cited the Ninth Circuit's Dietemann
opinion, which indicated that damages could be assessed for the publication of
improperly obtained information,498 its analysis of compensatory damages attempted
to segregate harm caused by the defendants' newsgathering techniques from events
caused by the publication of the article; only damages proximately caused by the
fraud and breach of contract were available.499 Judge Weber concluded that
W.D.I.A. was entitled to compensation for the expense of the trip to meet with Trans
Union officials. This trip was reasonable and necessary because of W.D.I.A.'s prior
experience after Trans Union learned ofthe ACB test.500 The question was whether
these expenses were the result of the defendants' fraud or harm from publication of
the result. Rothfeder accessed Vice-President Quayle's file on July 19, 1989; from
that date until publication of the article six weeks later, no one at W.D.I.A. or Trans
Union knew that Rothfeder had obtained Quayle's file.5"' If Business Week had
decided not to publish the results of Rothfeder's test, it is conceivable that neither
W.D.I.A. nor Trans Union would have learned of Rothfeder's actions. Judge Weber
concluded that W.D.I.A. suffered no damage prior to publication of the article." 2
In contrast to the expenses related to Trans Union, Judge Weber disallowed
W.D.I.A.'s expenses for trips to Washington and Arizona. Both trips were largely
public relations efforts to repair W.D.I.A.'s reputation with industry leaders.50 3
Judge Weber concluded that these trips "were not proximately caused by the fraud
and contract breach committed by the defendants. Those trips were made for reasons
unrelated to the breach of contract and fraud. They were made because of the
publication of the article."5" The line Judge Weber drew is very murky. All of
W.D.I.A.'s travel expenses stemmed from Business Week's disclosure of its fraud,
though Trans Union's prior termination of W.D.I.A.'s access to its files may have
made the efforts of W.D.I.A. towards Trans Union appear to be more serious than
mere image management.
Judge Weber disallowed all expenses relating to the FTC investigation because
there was no proof that Rothfeder had discussed W.D.I.A. with FTC officials while
491 See id. at 624.
498 Id.; see also supra notes 356-59 and accompanying text.
See W.D.I.A., 34 F. Supp. 2d at 627.
o See id. at 619 & 621.
50, See id. at 617.
502 See id.
503 For example, W.D.I.A. executives were advised by the head of the ACB to go to
Washington "'to tell your story about what you do so that... you don't leave it to those
who want to tell it in their own way ... you need to be there to take care of the whole
reputation, not just the Dan Quayle incident, but the whole reputation."' Id at 621 (quoting
FTC investigator Barry Connelly).
" See id. at 627 (emphasis added).
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researching the article,"' nor was there proof that the FTC investigation was caused
by the defendants' fraud or publication of the article." 6 Instead, the catalyst for the
FTC investigation was ACB's report to the FTC of W.D.I.A.'s failure in the
"mystery shopping" test.50 7
Punitive damages were not allowed for several reasons. First, the nondisclosure
of W.D.I.A.'s identity in the article demonstrated that the defendants lacked malice.5"8
Notice that this factor is tied to how the defendants published the information, not
how it was acquired. Second, the defendants' test of the credit-reporting system was
not egregious because "it served to inform Congress and the general public about a
matter of vital public interest . . . ."09 This brief passage is striking because it
reflects the view that disclosure of information which is tortiously acquired can have
social value. Stated differently, the information-collecting activities of those who
seek to inform the public are perceived differently from the activities of those who
have less socially important aims. Third, the defendants never engaged in
newsgathering conduct of this type before or after this case,5t0 and were "committed
to an enlightened philosophy that they will never again engage in similar conduct and
will always publish the truth."''
Although not stated in First Amendment terms, Judge Weber's approach to
punitive damages reflects important First Amendment concepts such as limiting such
damages to extreme circumstances. Under this approach, illegal newsgathering
activities aimed at uncovering information of public value would rarely, if ever,
justify punitive damages. Those activities, however, could support an award of
compensatory damages insofar as those damages exclude harm from publication.
CONCLUSION
Judge Holtzhoff s statement in Liberty Lobby that courts may not "review the
manner in which a newspaper man obtains his information' 512 seems quaint as courts
505 See id. at 618 & 623.
506 See id. at 619.
507 See id. at 618.
50" See id. at 622 & 628.
109 Id. at 628.
5 0 See id. at 623.
511 Id. at 628. After the decision was announced, McGraw-Hill's general counsel stated
that the company would consider engaging in similar conduct on a case-by-case basis.
Rothfeder also stated that he would use the same methods again "'if that's the only way to
tell the story and you're not going to harm anybody."' Dean Starkman & Gordon
Fairclough, Report in Business Week Draws Fraud Ruling, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1998, at
A3, A4 (quoting Jeffrey Rothfeder).
51, Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 261 F. Supp. 726, 727(D.D.C. 1966); see also supra
notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
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currently struggle to define the protection for newsgathering.1 3 As this Article has
shown, the definition of "routine" newsgathering techniques is obscure." 4
Consequently, there are too many unanswered questions about newsgathering to link
it to the protections for publication activities.' Even when newsgathering rights are
clearly delineated, it makes little sense to allow the content-neutral interests affected
by inappropriate investigatory methods to override the First Amendment's aversion
to content-based regulation, whether in the form of a prior restraint or a post-
publication penalty. Stated differently,just as the protection for publishing does not
provide immunity for newsgathering crimes, neither should newsgathering crimes
lessen the protection for publishing. The harms caused by illegal newsgathering
activities can be properly and narrowly remedied while still allowing compensation
for communicative impact if the latter claim is properly proven. Perhaps most
importantly, the social benefits of publishing illegally acquired information should
preclude punitive damages in most instances.
The most difficult cases are those in which a court defines the legality of
newsgathering by whether the information is published. In Cohen, for example, the
Court completely devalued protection for publication because the act of publishing
broke a promise that was made in order to acquire information.516 The Court sought
to treat the case as involving content-neutral interests, although the communicative
impact ofthe publication was the heart ofthe plaintiff's damage claim." 7 The fallacy
313 Compare Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that media
personnel accompanying federal agents during execution of search warrant are state actors),
with Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that media personnel
accompanying local police during execution of search warrant did not act under color of
law). In Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999), the Court ruled that a media "ride-along"
violates the Fourth Amendment. Separately, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's Berger
opinion, see Hanlon v. Berger, 119 S. Ct. 1706 (1999), and denied certiorari to a
companion case brought by CNN, see Cable News Network, Inc. v. Berger, 119 S. Ct. 2039
(1999). On remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision granting
summary judgment in favor of the media defendants on the Bergers' Bivens claim. See
Berger v. Hanlon, No. 96-35251, No. 96-35266, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20262, at *3 (9th
Cir. Aug. 27, 1999). The court of appeals also reversed the district court's judgment in
favor of the media defendants on the Bergers' state law claims for trespass and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. See id. The district court's grant of summary judgment to
the media defendants on the federal wiretap claim and the state law claim for conversion
was affirmed. See id.
5"4 See supra text accompanying notes 11-19 & 204-323.
515 For example, the record in FoodLion revealed that ABC "had, on previous occasions,
created deliberate deceptions for the purpose of securing jobs with companies which were
the target of an investigative report. This case, however, was the first time ABC's actions
in this regard were found to be unlawful." Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984
F. Supp. 923, 935 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
516 See supra note 362.
7 Justice White claimed that Cohen was not "seeking damages for injury to his
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of Cohen can be avoided by focusing on the consequences of publication, rather than
acting on a formalistic regard for broken promises. With this in mind, cases like Doe
should not be approached as mere contract cases, but should address the
communicative impact of breaking the physician-patient contract. The provenance of
the physician-patient dialogue does not dictate the outcome of the case, but it helps
explain why publication would be harmful. To this limited extent, the provenance of
information should be considered as courts grapple with the interplay between
information gathering and publishing.
reputation or his state of mind. He sought damages... for breach of a promise that caused
him to lose his job and lowered his earning capacity." Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501
U.S. 663, 671 (1991). Justice White draws a false distinction here. Defamation law allows
recovery for loss of employment and diminished earnings as one of the effects of injury to
reputation. See, e.g., Liquori v. Republican Co., 396 N.E.2d 726 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)
(sustaining damage award for defamatory newspaper article that led to loss of income). It
may be that Justice White believed the damages available in a promissory estoppel action
did not pose the chilling effect created in defamation actions by more open-ended damages
for harm to peace of mind. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670 (treating compensatory damages as
similar to payment to a source for newsworthy information). Nonetheless, this Article
agrees with Professor Easton who wrote, "Although the promise occurred during
newsgathering, the breach depended upon publication. The injury arose from publication,
not newsgathering, and the damages, although characterized as nonreputational, were
precisely that." Easton, supra note 9, at 1179-80.
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